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ABSTRACT 
 
  This dissertation focuses on entrepreneurial finance and exit strategies via IPO. 
Three quantitative studies have been conducted based on a dataset of entrepreneurial 
firms listed for the first time in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 2002 and 
2012. Initial Public Offering (IPO), as a major event for external resource acquisition, 
is a milestone in both the life of an entrepreneurial venture and the entrepreneur 
himself. How to gain a good performance in IPO? What factors drive their leave from 
the business they set up after IPO? And whether and how the founder’s leave after 
IPO may affect the subsequent performance of the business? These questions 
becomes main concerns for both entrepreneurs and investors. The three studies in the 
dissertation address these issues from different perspectives. Since the research 
questions and test variables are different across studies, the sample size for each 
empirical study is slightly different from each other.  
  The first study extends our understanding of the categorical imperative by 
exploring how the category spanning behavior of the main founders may harm their 
resource acquisition via IPO, as well as the way they offset such penalty. This 
question was tested using main founders of 173 startups listed for the first time in the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of LSE. The study supports the past literature 
confirming that, compared to IPO firms whose founders specialize in one industry or 
one function, those founded by category spanners are generally devalued by investors. 
However, such devaluation is less severe in case founders are partly hybrid, spanning 
categories in one dimension (either for industry or function) but being a specialist in 
the other dimension. The results also show that an external expert endorsement can 
offset the penalty of hybridity, especially when hybridity occurs along multiple 
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dimensions.  
  The second study explores variance in the exit decisions of founders after IPO, and 
examines factors explaining these decisions. Through analyzing the exit behavior of 
313 founders at 177 entrepreneurial firms listed in the main and alternative market of 
LSE, we find that power structure is associated with founders’ total exit but does not 
equally well explain partial exits behaviors (i.e. financial or managerial). Moreover, 
the effect of power on total exit is also moderated by the type of capital market in 
which the IPO takes place [main market of the LSE versus Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM)].  
   The third study examines whether and how different founder exit strategies 
influence a firm’s operational and stock performance. We find that while the post-IPO 
departure of the main founder is related to a short-term drop of the stock performance, 
in the long-run, it is positively related with the firm’s financial performance.  
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CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“An initial public offering (IPO) can provide an entrepreneurial firm 
with critical resources for its future expansion (Bruton, Chahine, 
Filatotchev, 2009). 
“The IPO is also an important channel through which an entrepreneur or 
venture capitalist gets rewarded for his initial effort” (Zingales, 1995). 
 
Initial Public Offerings (IPO), as a major event for external resource acquisition, is 
a milestone in both the life of an entrepreneurial venture and the entrepreneur himself. 
As an important event in the lifecycle of the entrepreneurial ventures, IPO not only 
provides the external financial capitals necessary for the further growth and expansion 
of the start-ups, but also improves firms’ legitimacy in the open market and helps the 
venture to access additional resource with less cost (Brau, Francis, & Kohers, 2003; 
Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995; Ravasi & Marchisio, 2003). In the UK, the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) provides a unique platform for SMEs to raise public funds, 
which helped 3701 start-ups in total (3037 British ventures and 664 international 
ventures) raise £41747.2million at the first launch from 1995 to 2016. And the IPO is 
only a start, the listed companies further raised £58219.3million through the AIM 
market during the period (AIM statistics, 2016). Taking the importance of IPO in the 
process of the venture growing, increasing management and entrepreneurship 
literature becomes interested in exploring and discussing the IPO activities from 
different perspective, among which the performance of offerings is the major concern 
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(Certo, Holcomb, & Jr, 2009). As a focal member in establishing and organizing the 
new venture, the founder’s influence has been proved to be persist in the process of 
external resource acquisition via IPO (Nelson, 2003 & 2007). However, prior 
literature has not further explored the heterogeneity in the association of external 
resource acquisition and different types of founders.  
Except for offering the external capital for the growth and expansion of the start-
ups, IPO also enables entrepreneurs and other investors to convert their equity into 
cash and generates a “dream-exit” route (Black & Gilson, 1998; Certo, Covin, Daily, 
& Dalton, 2001; Zingales, 1995). Entrepreneurial exit represents a major event of the 
entrepreneurial process, which has attracted increasing attention in the literature 
(Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; DeTienne, 2010). For founders, exit represents the time 
of harvesting, when they see the value of all their hard work invested into the business. 
For the firm, the departure of the founder may represent a change in the strategic 
orientations (Grusky, 1963; Pfeffer & Leblebici, 1973; Wiersema, 1992), as well as an 
infusion of new resources and energy (Haveman & Khaire, 2004). For the society, 
entrepreneurs free themselves from managing the business and focusing on 
identifying new opportunities may continually stimulate the growth of the economy 
(DeTienne, 2010). Despite the increasing attention to entrepreneurial exit research, 
most studies that viewed the IPO as a potential exit strategy only focus on investors 
perspective and discuss the phenomenon at the company level (Cumming, Fleming, & 
Schwienbacher, 2006; Bayar & Chemmanur, 2012). Very little is currently known in 
the existing literature on the factors that drive the founders leave the venture after IPO 
(DeTienne & Cardon, 2012), let alone the relationship between founders exit and the 
post-IPO performance of the business. Why entrepreneurs leave the business they 
founded after IPO, whether and how founder exit may affect the post-IPO operation 
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of the business has not been empirically tested. 
The dissertation, including three essays, aims to fill these gaps. Through 
empirically analyzing a novel, hand-collected data set of entrepreneurial IPOs in 
London between 2002 and 2013, these essays try to address 3 different research 
questions relevant to funding raised and entrepreneurial exit via IPO. The first essay 
applies social categorization theory to discuss the external resource acquisition ability 
of different entrepreneurs via IPO. Social categorization theory suggests that 
specialized providers are endowed with more resources than those spanning multiple 
categories. Yet, because category spanning may simultaneously happen along multiple 
relevant dimensions, research must ask how category spanning in such a 
multidimensional space shapes outcomes. We focus on new venture founders, 
categorized by investor audiences along their industry and functional backgrounds, 
and relate founder categorization to resource acquisition at IPO in the AIM market. 
We find that, compared to IPO firms whose founders specialize in one industry or one 
function, those founded by category spanners are generally devalued by investors. 
Devaluation is most severe in case founders are fully hybrid, by spanning both 
industrial and functional categories. However, an external expert endorsement—in 
our case, intensive VC affiliations—can offset the penalty of hybridity, especially 
when hybridity occurs along multiple dimensions. 
The second essay investigates the relationship between the power the founder holds 
at the time of IPO and their decision to exit the venture after IPO. More specifically, 
we distinguish between three exit options: Founders may exit financially, selling all 
their shares; or may exit managerially, leaving the top management team and the 
board of directors; or may exit totally (managerially and financially). In general, the 
IPO represents a time of great change for the venture in terms of both operating 
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control and business direction (Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998; Chahine & 
Goergen, 2011). We find that the power structure is indeed associated with total exit 
of founders. Founders that remain with less power at the time of IPO are more likely 
to totally exit the company they created after taking it public. Moreover, we find that 
the effect of power structure on total exit is moderated by the type of capital market 
where the IPO takes place (LSE versus AIM). But the power-succession mechanism 
does not explain equally well partial exits (i.e. financial and managerial). Actually, 
founders’ financial exit behavior is more likely to be driven by their motivation of 
going public, and their managerial exit is driven by the life style issues, such as 
ageing problem.  
The third essay explores the association of entrepreneurial exit with the 
performance of the firm after IPO. After discussing the benefits and the drawbacks of 
entrepreneurial exit for the listed firms, we apply the techniques of event analysis and 
panel regression to examine the relationship between entrepreneurial exit after IPO 
with the venture performance in short-run and long-run period, separately. We find 
that the departure of the founder is related to a short-term drop of the stock 
performance, suggesting that the entrepreneurial exit increases the uncertainty of the 
firm operation in the future which reduces the investors’ trust in the open market. On 
the contrary, the founders’ exit has a positive relationship with the annual return on 
assets, confirming that the transition of the business from entrepreneurial management 
to professional management trigged by the founder exit will finally improve the firm 
operation. 
These three essays examine the relationship between entrepreneur presence, exit, 
venture performance and the external resource acquisition. As a whole, this 
dissertation contributes to both the entrepreneurship and general management 
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literature by enhancing our understanding about the role of the founder in the IPO 
process (before and after) for the entrepreneurial ventures. It contributes to the social 
categorization theory by proving that in a multidimensional space, specialization in 
one categorical dimension can, partly or fully, offset the hybridity penalty from 
category spanning along another dimension. It contributes to the power-succession 
literature by extending its application to a novel context of entrepreneurial exit. It 
contributes to the entrepreneurial exit literature by introducing a new theoretical angle 
to explain the empirically overlooked phenomenon (namely founder exit via IPO), as 
well as by differentiating between the anticipation and real effect of founder exit over 
the company performance. And in practice, the findings in the dissertation help 
entrepreneurs address their main concerns during the IPO, that is how to gain a good 
performance in the IPO and where should they go after that.  
15 
CHAPTER 2 FOUNDERS’ BI-DIMENSIONAL 
CATEGORIZATION AND MONEY RAISED AT IPO 
 
ABSTRACT 
  Social categorization theory suggests that specialized providers are endowed with 
more resources than those spanning multiple categories. Yet, because category 
spanning may simultaneously happen along multiple relevant dimensions, research 
must ask how category spanning in such a multidimensional space shapes outcomes. 
Does the hybridity penalty apply for each of category dimension separately? Does 
category spanning in multiple dimensions simultaneously increase the penalty of 
hybridity? Or can specialization in one dimension offset the penalty of category 
spanning in another dimension?  
In this study, we focus on founders of new ventures, categorized by investor 
audiences along their industry and functional backgrounds (a two-dimensional space) 
and we relate founder categorization to resource acquisition at IPO. By analyzing a 
novel, hand-collected dataset of 173 entrepreneurial IPOs in the Alternative 
Investment Market in London (2002-2013), we find that, compared to IPO firms 
whose founders specialize in one industry or one function, those founded by category 
spanners are generally devalued by investors. However, devaluation is less severe in 
case founders are partly hybrid, spanning categories in one dimension (either for 
industry or function) but being a specialist in the other dimension.  We also show that 
an external expert endorsement—in our case, intensive VC affiliations—can offset the 
penalty of hybridity, especially when hybridity occurs along multiple dimensions.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
By providing a comparison set, social categories help individuals quickly and 
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efficiently process information (Douglas, 1986; Zerubavel, 1996) and facilitate 
audience make judgments about value and worth (e.g., Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; 
Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2005; Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa, & Rittmann, 2003). Over 
the past two decades, an increasing number of management scholars became 
interested in the process and influence of social categorization (Vergne & Wry, 2014).  
A major argument that cuts across these studies is that items who fail to fit any 
established category will be less legitimate and appealing to the audience and 
therefore be devalued, an effect which is known as the ‘categorical imperative’ 
(Zuckerman, 1999; Zuckerman et. al, 2003). For producers, due to time and resource 
constraints, spanning categories risks offering lower quality products across any 
category (Freeman & Hannan, 1983; Dobrev, Kim, & Hannan, 2001; Hsu, Koçak, & 
Hannan, 2009); from an audience perspective, category spanners often generate vague 
identities which are difficult to be identified and/or evaluated (Zuckerman 1999; Rao, 
Monin, & Durand, 2005; Hsu, 2006). Such effect has been empirically tested and 
verified in a number of industry contexts, as the stock market (Zuckerman, 1999), the 
film industry (Hsu, 2006), the on-line business (Hsu et al., 2009) and the wine 
industry (Negro, Hannan, & Rao, 2010). More recently the social categorization 
literature has focused on the boundary conditions of the categorical imperative. 
Category characteristics (Ruef & Patterson, 2009; Kovács & Hannan, 2010, 2015), 
audience expectation (Pontikes, 2012; Paolella & Durand, 2015), as well as the 
context they analyze (Vergne, 2012; Alexy & George, 2013) were found to affect the 
relationship between category spanning and audience evaluation, suggesting more 
complexity in understanding the mechanism.  
While the current literature is concerned with actors categorized within a single 
dimension, audiences often think of producers along multiple relevant dimensions. 
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For example, restaurants can be categorized according to their food and their style; a 
restaurant can specialize in formal dining but at the same time offer a ‘category 
spanning’ mix of French and Chinese food. In another context, management 
academics can be categorized according to both their field and method expertise; a 
scholar can be a ‘hybrid’ between organizational behavior and strategy but he or she 
can be a specialist in lab experiments. While category-spanning in multidimensional 
spaces is a common phenomenon (Zhao, 2005), how it shapes outcomes is still 
unclear. Does the hybridity penalty apply for each of dimension separately? Can 
specialization in one dimension offset the penalty of category spanning in another 
dimension?  
Our study aims at explore these questions in the bi-dimensional category space of 
founders of entrepreneurial firms looking for investment via an IPO. Founders 
significantly influence companies’ resource acquisition ability (Certo, Covin, Daily, & 
Dalton, 2001; Nelson, 2003; 2007; Chahine, Filatotchev, & Zahra, 2011). Founder 
identity, built through a history of career experiences, testifies their ability to manage 
a business of a certain type, and also helps to legitimize the entrepreneurial firm, 
which significantly decrease the uncertainty of the investment (Delmar & Shane, 
2004). In the context of entrepreneurial IPOs, we submit that industry and functional 
background are two salient dimensions that characterize founders, in that investor 
audiences likely devote attention to both dimensions when evaluating a particular firm. 
Importantly, at a general level, there is agreement among the audience members on 
the distinct categories recognized within the industry and occupational dimensions, so 
much so that categories on both dimensions are habitually collected in standardized 
categorical schemata [e.g. the Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) and the 
International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO)].  
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Interestingly, while recent years have witnessed an increasing interest among 
organization scholars in the study of categories in entrepreneurship and emerging 
industries (Glynn & Navis, 2013; Wry & Lounsbury, 2013; Zhao, Ishihara, & 
Lounsbury, 2013), most efforts have focused on the analysis at the product, 
organization or market level, rather than discussing categories of founders (with the 
exception of Roberts, Negro, & Swaminathan, 2013). Exploring the categorical 
imperative in the context of founders is particularly interesting, in the light of the 
“jack-of-all-trades” theory (Lazear, 2004) which argues that successful entrepreneurs 
should be multifaceted and have to hold a balanced skill set.  
By analyzing a novel, hand-collected dataset of 173 entrepreneurial firms listed for 
the first time in the Alternative Investment Market of London Stock Exchange, we 
found that compared with founders specialized in a specific industrial or functional 
category, category spanners are devalued by investors in general. This penalty is most 
severe for firms whose founders are fully hybrid—that is, they span both industrial 
and functional boundaries. We also found that an external expert endorsement, in our 
case intensive VC affiliations, can serve to offset the penalty associated with 
founder’s hybridity, especially when such hybridity occurs along both the industry 
and functional dimensions.   
Our findings enrich the literature on social categories (Zuckerman, 1999; 
Zuckerman et. al, 2003; Vergne & Wry, 2014) by exploring the categorical imperative 
effect under conditions of multiple salient classification. Based in the context of 
founders of IPO firms, we submit that while there is still a hybridity penalty for each 
category dimension separately, specialization in one dimension offsets (partly or fully) 
the negative effect of hybridity in the other dimension. In practical terms, category 
spanners looking to suspend themselves from the hybridity penalty should position as 
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a specialist in at least one of the two dimensions. Moreover, our study also contributes 
to the literature on entrepreneurial external resource acquisition (main references here) 
by further discussing the role of founder projected identity in the resource acquisition 
process. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Social categories segment objects into different comparison sets, which enable 
individuals process open market information quickly and efficiently (Douglas, 1986; 
Zerubavel, 1996). They facilitate typecasting members to build up a clear identity and 
legitimate themselves in front of an audience, by providing the grouping structure that 
conveys distinctions between members. Concurrently, audiences will easily recognize 
them and make a judgment over their quality based on the expectation of certain 
group (Khaire & Wadhwani, 2010; Rao et al., 2003; Zuckerman et al., 2003). Instead, 
category spanners (‘Jack-of-all-trades’), fail to fall into any single category and may 
find difficulty in making sense of their identity, and thereby increase their likelihood 
to be ignored or undervalued, since it is not clear the types of expertise they have, or 
the way they should be evaluated (Wry, Lounsbury, & Jennings, 2014). Also, category 
spanners are believed to disperse their effort into different streams and result in poor 
performance in each category. And due to time and resource constraints, spanning 
categories reduces the ability of Jack-of-all-trades to effectively target and attract each 
category audience and eventually being penalized (Hsu et al., 2009). Such “category 
imperative” mechanism has been tested empirically in different contexts, such as 
stock market (Zuckerman, 1999), film industry (Hsu, 2006), on-line business (Hsu et 
al., 2009) and wine industry (Negro et al., 2010), and some moderators have also been 
discussed (Vergne & Wry, 2014). It has been shown to be reinforced when the 
organization straddles more categories (Durand, Rao, & Monin, 2007) and/or the 
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categories straddling are high in contrast (Kovács & Hannan, 2010; Negro, Hannan, 
& Rao, 2011), since individuals in a high-contrast category are either perceived as 
nearly fully fledged or not members at all (Negro et al., 2011). The less fuzziness 
boundary of the category assigns a clear label to its membership, indicating that the 
image of spanners between such categories would be more contradicted, and therefore 
further decrease their appealing. This concept improves the category study by 
pointing out the role of category characteristics in the categorical imperative 
framework. However, past studies only focus on the most salient category of test 
items, such as movies are categorized into genres (Hsu, 2006), patents into technology 
classes (Wry & Lounsbury, 2013), mutual funds into high and low risk (Lounsbury & 
Rao, 2004), and do not further discuss the influence of multiple competing categories 
on audience evaluation (Kulik, Roberson, & Perry, 2007). They do not further 
compare the influence across different category dimensions and discuss the cross-
classification condition. In fact, individuals could be grouped into a different 
dimension of categories (Kulik et al., 2007), which would be no major difference in 
the saliency. Such as Vergne (2012) states in the study that arms industry stakeholders 
could be classified into industry, customer, and country categories, while, he is 
“unable to provide a reliable rank-ordering of the three categories along the saliency 
criterion”. The multi-dimension of categorical memberships may help to mitigate the 
legitimacy discount, as category spanners could be fitted with an alternative 
classification system (Kacperczyk and Younkin, 2017). In terms of entrepreneurship, 
both ‘industry’ and ‘business function’ are salient category dimensions that 
characterize founders in entrepreneurial startups, in that investor audiences likely 
devote attention to both dimensions when evaluating a particular firm ((Kacperczyk 
and Younkin, 2017). Moreover, we submit that, at a general level, there is agreement 
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among audience members on the distinct categories recognized within the industry 
and occupational function dimensions, so much so that categories on both dimensions 
are habitually collected in standardized categorical schemata. For example, industries 
are commonly categorized according to standard industrial classification systems, 
such as the North American Industry Classification System (NAISC) or the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB), while occupational functions have been categorized 
in systems like the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). In 
such case, do individuals have to specialize in every category dimension to be a 
perfect expert to gain audience recognition, or just being typical in one category could 
prevent them from being penalized for hybridization in other dimensions of categories? 
There is no clear answer for this question in the existing literature. In this study, we 
target at answering this question through comparing the resource acquisition ability 
via IPO of different types of founders (specialist or category-spanner). 
IPO, as an important external acquisition process, is characterized by high levels of 
information asymmetry. Since the great uncertainty increases the risk for public 
investors to invest in the new start-ups that lack information in the public market, any 
information disclosed to reduce the uncertainty and improve the legitimacy of the 
offering will contribute to the IPO performance. As a focal member in establishing 
and organizing the new venture, the founder is usually the figurehead of the new 
venture, such as Bill Gates for Microsoft, Steve Jobs for Apple, Mark Zuckerberg for 
Facebook and etc. Nelson (2003, 2007) has differentiated the role of the founder from 
other upper echelons and suggests that the founder influence is stronger in raising 
money at IPO than others. He argues that a visible founder, who serve as a focal point 
for other top managers because of their knowledge, experience, and organizational 
status, plays an extraordinary role in defining the mission and structure of the firm 
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(Gimeno et al., 1997; Nelson, 2003).  Also as the longest tenured member of the 
organization, the founder’s industry knowledge and practice play a central role in the 
development of firm’s information sources, relationships and problem-solving 
routines, whose power cannot be easily substituted by other managers (Nelson, 2007). 
Meanwhile, compared with other top managers, the main founder who develops a 
closer link with the start-ups is usually more visible in front of investors. He/she is 
more frequently mentioned in the firm document and more likely to be referred, in the 
mass media, together with the firm. All these factors push the main founder to play a 
more salient role than the other top managers in legitimating and signaling the 
company. Since outsider investors cannot observe the comprehensive set of skills and 
quality of the founder, founder’s reputation and identity becomes critical for the 
company to gain legitimacy and raise funding from external sources (Higgins & 
Gulati 2006; Shane & Stuart 2002). Specialized in an industry or/and functional 
category helps the founder to build up a clear professional identity, which may 
contribute to reducing the uncertainty of the founder himself and enhance the 
legitimacy of the entrepreneurial firm in the open market. Also, the claim of 
specialization in a certain industry or/and function not only signifies the founder’s 
expertise in a certain business area, but also reveals the plausibility of his 
entrepreneurial endeavor in this industry/function, which may facilitate investors’ 
evaluation of his firm (Navis & Glynn, 2011). In contrast, founders who are category 
spanners might be less recognized by the public investors and therefore, reducing 
their chances of success in resource acquisition (Dobrev et. al, 2001; Zuckerman, 
1999). Therefore, we hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 1a. When the founder of an IPO firm is assigned to multiple industry 
categories, the firm’s resource acquisition is lower than a firm whose founder is 
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assigned to a single industry category. 
Hypothesis 1b. When the founder of an IPO firm is assigned to multiple functional 
categories, the firm’s resource acquisition is lower than a firm whose founder is 
assigned to a single functional category. 
When dealing with multi-dimensional classification, investors are less likely to 
evaluate each category dimension totally separately. Therefore, the categorical 
imperative effects between each dimension are expected to interact with each other. 
As in their resume, founders not only present their industry experience, but also 
highlight the role they played in the old business. Since founder’s functional 
experience signals his ability to work in a certain position or possession of 
professional skills, the entrepreneur who specializes in the certain functional category 
could also build up a clear identity in front of audience, even though he may not focus 
in a particular industry category. For example, a founder having worked across 
industries cannot argue that he is an expert in any business area. However, he may 
develop an image of a professional financial manager, who keeps working in financial 
function in different industries. This may facilitate the investors’ recognition and 
reduce the disapproval caused by the industry category spanning. Also, a founder 
having worked in different functions in the same industry can also highlight his 
expertise in the specific industry, who would increase investors’ confidence, in 
compared with founders who are fully hybrid in both category dimensions. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that  
Hypothesis 2. When the founder of an IPO firm spans both industry and functional 
categories, the firm’s resource acquisition is lower than a firm whose founder is a 
specialist in part or in full. 
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As discussed before, a category spanner cannot build up a clear identity and 
therefore fail to gain legitimacy of themselves and their start-ups in front of audience. 
How could they reduce the investment uncertainty and gain the trust of the public 
investors becomes the main concern of founders in the resource acquisition process. 
Prior studies (Sanders & Boivie, 2004) would suggest that affiliations with credible 
third parties may provide a substitute for perceived uncertainty regarding internal 
aspects of a firm, such as those due to progressive hybridity of founders, especially 
when such uncertainty is greatest (i.e., in the case of full hybrids). One such affiliation 
would be to VCs, whose retained equity signals their confidence in the IPO firm. The 
VC's involvement signifies the low-risk characteristics of the entrepreneurial 
companies to the open market, which increases the possibility of IPO success 
(Chahine, Filatotchev, & Wright, 2007), and such a signal would have the greatest 
impact especially for firms whose founders are fully hybrid. Moreover, when category 
spanners are supported by venture capitalists, who are efficient in information 
packaging and presenting, they are more likely to attract audience attention and secure 
their confidence, thus increasing the reward. Consequently, we hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 3. The proportion of equity retained by venture capitalists increases the 
resource acquisition of an IPO firm whose founder spans both industry and 
occupational categories compared to one whose founder is a specialist in part or in 
full. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Data Sources 
To test our hypotheses, we start collecting the data from an initial sample consisting 
of all UK companies that completed IPO between 2002 and 2013 (to avoid the “dot. 
bomb” period), instead of conducting the study on a single or several selected 
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industries (Martins, Jennings & Jennings, 2007; Wu & Dokko, 2007). From the 
original list, we exclude re-admissions companies. We exclude IPOs of investment 
trusts since they have very specific governance characteristics (Chahine et al., 2007), 
additionally, it would be difficult to identify a founder. We exclude all IPOs that 
represent de-mergers, equity carve-outs, reverse takeovers and equity reorganizations. 
Investment and acquisition vehicles are also excluded since the original founders are 
no longer with the company at IPO. Our research focuses on IPO performance of 
entrepreneurial firm; therefore, we excluded all firms that were incorporated more 
than ten years before IPO in order to ensure that the firms in our sample were still in 
the young, entrepreneurial phase of their life cycles (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 
2003; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Taulaulicar, Grundei, & Werder, 2005). 
Meanwhile, since stock performances are systematically different between the main 
market (LSE) and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and most entrepreneurial 
company are first listed on the AIM market in the UK, we exclude the companies who 
are initially listed in the main market (less than 5%). We also eliminate companies 
that appear as subsidiaries and spin-offs for which it is not always possible to identify 
the founder (Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007). After these selection steps, the final sample 
includes 173 entrepreneurial firms (see details in Table1). For each firm, we identify 
original founders through information provided in the IPO prospectuses. In dealing 
with entrepreneurial firms with multiple founders, we only choose the main founder, 
instead of analyzing the whole founding team. The main founder here refers to those 
who claim to be the leader of the founding team, the major shareholder, or those who 
are still actively involved in operation work during the time of IPO (e.g. playing the 
role of CEO/chairman). We choose the main founder since they play a key role in 
founding and developing the business, who are also more salient in the financing 
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process and significantly affect the legitimacy of the company. 
Table 1 Sampled IPOs by industry and year 
 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
Oil & Gas 0 3 3 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 9  
Basic Materials 1 2 2 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 12  
Industrials 4 9 7 5 4 1 6 2 1 1 0 40  
Consumer Goods 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8  
Health Care 1 7 4 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 19  
Consumer Services 4 6 14 7 5 0 3 1 1 1 1 43  
Telecommunications 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8  
Utilities 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2  
Financials 3 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 8  
Technology 2 5 9 3 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 24  
Total 16 42 41 26 14 2 12 5 4 4 7 173  
 
 
 
IPO prospectus is used as the major sauce of information in our coding process. As 
one of the key registration filing, the prospectus is believed to be a superior source of 
IPO firm information regarding the quality and potential for the firm, as it contains 
information for which IPO firm owners/managers can be held legally accountable 
with regard to the accuracy of the information (Welbourne & Cyr, 1999). IPO related 
studies have confirmed the efficacy of the prospectus information as a signal (Certo, 
Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Daily, Certo, Dalton, & Roengpitya, 2003; Martens et al., 
2007) in the IPO process.  
Dependent and Independent Variables 
Our study is targeting at the resource acquisition ability of the entrepreneurial firm 
via IPO. Therefore, we select IPO proceeds, calculated as offer price multiplied by the 
number of shares sold in the offering, logged transformed, as the dependent variable 
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(Certo, Holcomb, & Holmes, 2009).  
The first and second independent variables of our analysis are industry and 
functional category spanning of the main founder. We dummy code founders who 
have worked across industries/functions as 1, and 0 otherwise. We use the resume 
they present in the prospectus as the coding resource to identify whether they are 
category spanners or not. We choose the resume in the prospectus, as it conveys a 
comprehensive and memorable image for founders and the top management team in 
front of outsiders, providing an initial way for investors to measure their ability and 
credibility. Also, what they present in the resume is what they highlight and what they 
think will attract the investors to add value to their stock. Besides, after checking, we 
find that their resume presented in the prospectus has also been widely spread, such as 
on their personal homepage (LinkedIn, Facebook, etc.), the company website, 
investment websites and even in the mass media, which greatly increase its influence. 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) structure is selected to categorize the 
founders’ industry experience since this framework has been adopted by LSE and 
most founders’ follow this structure to introduce themselves in the resume, which 
would be more clear and salient than other classification methods. In terms of 
function categories, we develop function classifications based on the Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) Hierarchy of office of national statistics in UK and 
the content analysis of our dataset, which includes administration; R&D, technique 
and engineering; finance; sales and marketing; human resource management; 
manufacturing and production; legal; others. 
To test hypothesis 2, we classified all founders into three groups: 1) Full specialist, 
referring to founders who keep working in both the same industry and function; 2) 
Partial specialist, referring to the founder who either presents the tracking record of 
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working experience at the same function across industries or at different functions but 
within the same industry; 3) Full hybrid, referring to founder who presents to work 
across functions in diversified industries. We treated the first group as baseline and 
dummy coded the other two groups. In order to test the moderating role of VC's 
involvement, we use the proportion of venture capital retained equity to capture the 
involvement intensive in our analysis. 
Control Variables 
Based on the past IPO analysis, three levels of control variables are included in our 
model. At the market level, we use the MSCI UK index to control for the total stock 
and equity performance of the market during the IPO year. At the firm level, we 
control for the firm age, since firms with longer tracking records are suggested to 
have a higher chance of IPO success (Chang, 2004). We controlled for the level of the 
firm's risk by calculating the number of risk factors presented in the prospectus, which 
has been proved to be valuable in predicting the price premium in IPO (Daily et al., 
2003; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996). Given the industry differences between the 
entrepreneurial firms, we use dummies to control for the biotechnology companies 
and information technology companies, in comparison with the relatively stable and 
mature industries (Martens et al., 2007). Larger organizations usually have greater 
access to resources essential for firm survival and profitability (Finkle, 1998), and 
compared with smaller firms, larger companies present less uncertainty to potential 
investors. Therefore, we use the total assets, in logged form, as a measure to control 
for the size of the company. And in order to control for the business performance, we 
calculate the average turnover growth of the business within three years before the 
IPO. Governance parameters also serve as a useful screening and sorting criteria that 
affect investors’ valuation of IPO firm (Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Sanders & 
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Boivie, 2004), therefore, we include board size and board independence in our 
regression to control for the managerial ability of the entrepreneurial firm. Besides, 
the length of locking period, in month, is also included, since it not only signals the 
firm quality but also alleviate moral hazard problem (Brav & Gompers, 2003). Next, 
we control for the underwriter prestige, since the high reputation of advisor may help 
to reduce the uncertainty of the issue, and therefore increase investors’ confidence in 
the company (Carter & Manaster, 1990). At the individual level, we control for 
founders retained equity, which signals to investors the confidence that entrepreneurs 
have in the future prospects of the firm. On one hand, investors view high levels of 
founder ownership as an indication that the goals of firms’ managers/owners are 
aligned with those of potential investors, which may help the company raise fund in 
the IPO process (Daily et al., 2003); on the other hand, high proportion of founders 
ownership indicates that the founding group has already held a large amount of 
resource, and resource acquisition is not the main reason for IPO. Previous studies 
show that firms controlled by the founder-CEO are structurally distinct in ownership 
and management characteristics and founder-led firms present a valuable stability to 
investors, thereby collecting a higher premium of the stock price over book value at 
IPO (Nelson, 2003). We, therefore, dummy code founder-CEO as a control in our 
model. Meanwhile, we calculate the main founder’s external board positions as 
holding in other firms within 5 years before IPO, which obtained from the “Other 
Directorships” section of the prospectus (Finkle, 1998; Higgi & Gulati, 2003; Bruton, 
Chahine, & Filatotchev, 2009), since they are not only closely related to the founders’ 
past experience, but also signaling founders’ human and social capital and influencing 
their operation of the company. We next control for the founder age, since the older 
they are, the longer industry experience they had and the more diversified their 
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experience tended to be.   
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Analysis 
From 2002 to 2013, entrepreneurs in our sample raised 8.02 million pounds on 
average in the AIM market, and the average market value of the business reached to 
22.04 million (at offer price). The average age of the IPO companies is 59 months 
(4.9 years), with 14% of them operating in IT industries and 8% in the biotech sector. 
At the time of IPO, 56% entrepreneurial firms still appoint the original founder as 
CEO, with 27.3% equity held by the founding team, suggesting that founders still 
play key roles at this stage for most entrepreneurial firms. The average age of main 
founders is 46, who are holding 9 directorships on average in other business at the 
time of IPO.  
Table 2 shows selected statistics that allow for an initial, purely descriptive, 
assessment of our hypotheses. Panel A concerns the independent and interactive 
effects of category spanning in the industry and occupational domains. Consistent 
with Hypotheses 1a and 1b, the average level of resource acquisition (i.e., the log of 
net IPO proceeds) is higher in subsamples of IPO firms whose founders are industry 
or occupational specialists compared to those in which founders are industry or 
occupational hybrids (i.e., 1.528 million versus 1.170 million and 1.639 million 
versus 1.164 million, respectively). Consistent with Hypothesis 2, moreover, the 
average level of resource acquisition is higher in the subsample of IPO firms whose 
founders are fully specialized than that in the subsample of IPO firms whose founders 
are only partly specialized (i.e., 1.766 million versus 1.320 million), which again is 
higher than the subsample of IPO firms whose founders are fully hybrid (i.e., 1.320 
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million versus 1.089 million).  
Table 2 Descriptive assessment of hypotheses 
 
 
 
Panel B of Table 2 concerns the moderating effect of the share of retained equity by 
VCs. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the correlation between VCs retained equity and 
resource acquisition is lowest and slightly negative in the subsample of IPO firms 
whose founders are fully specialized, while it becomes progressively stronger as well 
as positive in subsamples of IPO firms whose founders are, respectively, partly 
specialized or fully hybrid. Descriptively, therefore, VCs retained equity would 
appear to act as an offset to the penalty associated with hybridity. 
The column to the right of Panel B also provides an indirect indication that VC 
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ownership may constitute a particularly valuable signal in IPO firms whose founders 
are fully hybrid. If founder hybridity in industries and occupations creates ambiguity 
and uncertainty, then VCs should be more careful in taking large ownership positions 
in IPO firms whose founders are in part or fully hybrid. Data on average retained 
equity by VCs show exactly that. Among IPO firms with fully specialized founders, 
the average share of retained equity by VCs is equal to 0.166, while that share 
decreases to 0.056 in firms with partly specialized founders, and it is as low as 0.033 
in those with fully hybrid founders. Such progressive selectivity might be interpreted 
as an increase in scrutiny befalling IPO firms as founder hybridity increases, even by 
comparatively well-informed insiders such as VCs. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, this 
apparent selection process should elevate outsider confidence especially in those 
firms with fully hybrid founders, where VCs nevertheless chose to retain high levels 
of equity. 
Multivariate Analysis 
Although the descriptive statistics in Table 2 are consistent with our hypotheses, we 
now turn to multivariate regression analysis that allows us to account for a variety of 
alternative explanations, as such producing a more rigorous assessment of our theory. 
Table 3 shows OLS estimates of the log of net IPO proceeds. Model 1 examines the 
set of control variables, while models 2-5 examine Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2, i.e., the 
independent and joint effects of founder category spanning along industry and 
functional dimensions. Model 6 examines the moderating effect of VC retained equity 
as proposed in Hypothesis 3. We found some evidence of heteroscedasticity in the 
residuals and so in all models we report heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
due to White (White, 1982). Alternative approaches, clustering standard errors by 
years or industries, generated identical conclusions to the ones deriving from Table 3. 
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Across the six models, average and maximum variance inflation factors were in the 
range of 1.33-1.55 and 2.28-2.52, respectively, all well below the commonly accepted 
threshold of ten (Kennedy, 2003). Thus, multicollinearity appeared unproblematic for 
our analysis.  
Model 1 shows that firms with founder CEOs, larger firms, firms listing more risk 
factors, and those with larger boards secure more capital at IPO. Consistent with 
Hypotheses 1a and b, models 2 and 3 show that industry and functional hybridity of 
founders is associated with lower resource acquisition, all other variables held 
constant. Model 4 shows that these negative associations remain statistically 
significant when both independent variables enter the estimation simultaneously. 
Moreover, the magnitudes of the main effects are similar (F [1df] = 0.06, p = 0.81), 
consistent with the idea that outsider audiences devote comparable attention to both 
dimensions when evaluating a particular IPO firm. In terms of the magnitude of these 
main effects, the estimates in model 4 suggest that, compared to IPO firms whose 
founders are industry specialists, those whose founders are industry hybrids on 
average secure about 26% less capital (i.e., a multiplicative factor of exp[-0.296*1] = 
0.74). Similarly, compared to IPO firms whose founders are functional specialists, 
those whose founders are functional hybrids on average secure about 30% less capital 
(i.e., a multiplicative factor of exp[-0.363*1] = 0.70). Thus, not only are the 
coefficients for founders’ industry and functional hybridity statistically significant, 
both also represent sizeable effects in real terms. 
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Table 3 Results of linear regression analysis for resource acquisition 
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Model 5 shows that IPO firms whose founders are partial specialist have IPO 
proceeds that are statistically indistinguishable from those whose founders are fully 
specialized. However, in support of Hypothesis 2, firms whose founders are fully 
hybrid secure significantly less capital than those whose founders are either part 
specialist (F [1df] = 4.40, p = 0.04) or fully specialized (t [1df] = -2.64, F [1df] = 6.99, 
p = 0.009). In other words, founder hybridity appears particularly problematic when 
such hybridity occurs simultaneously along both industry and functional dimensions. 
In real terms, the effect is again substantial. Compared to IPO firms whose founders 
are fully specialized, those whose founders are fully hybrid on average secure about 
47% less capital (i.e., a multiplicative factor of exp[-0.638*1] = 0.53). 
Finally, model 6 tests Hypothesis 3, predicting that VCs retained equity acts to 
offset the penalty associated with full hybridity—i.e., the penalty as predicted in 
Hypothesis 2 and shown in model 5. The coefficient on the interaction between partial 
specialist and VCs retained equity is not significantly different from zero, even 
though the main effect on partial specialist is now marginally significant and negative. 
The coefficient on the interaction between full hybrid and VCs retained equity is 
statistically significant and positive, suggesting that VCs retaining more equity has 
positive effects on the ability of IPO firms to secure capital in those firms whose 
founders are fully hybrid. In real terms, a one-standard deviation increase in VC 
retained equity is associated with about a 21% increase in IPO proceeds in firms 
whose founders are fully hybrid (i.e., a multiplicative factor of exp[2.418*0.08] = 
1.21).  
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Figure 1 Multiplier of ln (IPO proceeds) relative to firms with fully specialized founders 
 
 
 
In relation to the results in model 6, a question arises as to when the offsetting role 
of VCs retained equity is large enough for IPO firms with fully hybrid founders to 
raise equal or larger amounts of capital than those firms with partly or fully 
specialized owners. To provide a tentative answer to this question, Figure 1 uses the 
estimates in model 6 of Table 3 to illustrate the abilities of IPO firms with partly 
specialized or fully hybrid founders to raise capital relative to those with fully 
specialized founders, and how these vary across the observed range of VCs retained 
equity in the subsample of firms (N = 64) whose founders are fully hybrid. At low 
levels of VCs retained equity, IPO firms with fully hybrid founders on average secure 
less capital than all others. However, when VCs retained equity surpasses the 0.18 
level, which is the 94th percentile, those with fully hybrid founders begin to raise 
equal or larger amounts of capital than those with partly specialized founders. 
Moreover, when VCs retained equity rises further and surpasses the 0.32 level, which 
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is the 98th percentile, IPO firms with fully hybrid founders begin to raise equal or 
larger amounts of capital than even those with fully specialized founders. Overall, 
within our estimation sample, although increases in VCs retained equity consistently 
increase the ability of firms with fully hybrid founders to secure capital relative to 
other firms, only at very high levels does VCs retained equity fully offset the penalty 
associated with full hybridity. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In this study, we focus on further exploring how category spanners are undervalued 
by external audiences, and discussing factors that may help category spanners 
legitimate themselves and reduce the penalty. According to our empirical analysis, 
when individuals could be grouped by multiple salient category structures, specialized 
in one dimension of categories would help them to build up a legitimate identity, and 
thereby may reduce to some extent or even eliminate the punishment generated from 
the hybridity in other category groups. We next extend the category imperative 
framework by considering the role of 3rd party in legitimating category spanners and 
improving their audience appealing. In the past studies, scholars attribute the 
economic disadvantage of category spanners either to their lower quality across each 
category they straddling or to the unclear identity leading them more likely to be 
ignored (Hsu, 2009). An external expert may help the category spanners by solving 
both the problems. Their expertise may improve audiences’ trust over the category 
spanners’ quality in a certain area; also their reputation and prestige may enhance 
audiences’ recognition of the organization, therefore decreasing their likelihood to 
slip over the spanners’ complex image.  
Our study confirms the validity of categorical imperative mechanism for the 
entrepreneur and more importantly further develops its theoretical framework. More 
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important, our study recognizes the importance of studying broader sets of 
categorizations and cross-classification effect, rather than simply locating on one 
dimension of categories (Hsu, 2006; Hsu & Hannan, 2005; Hsu et al., 2009). Indeed, 
most items in the world are categorized in multiple ways, and the saliency of those 
categories is similar for audience. Individuals do not have to be specialized in every 
category dimension in order to develop a clear identity. These finding may have the 
potential to sensitize scholars to look into the interactions between multiple categories, 
identities and audiences, and thereby better understand social categorization process.  
In terms of entrepreneurial resource acquisition studies, as an important stage for 
entrepreneurs to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities and expand the business, 
considerable effort has been made to explore the factors that contribute to ventures 
acquiring external resources (Shane, 2003; Brau & Fawcett, 2006). Our analysis 
supports the argument that founders, as the initial architects of the companies’ 
structure and strategy, significantly influence companies’ resource acquisition ability 
in IPO (Nelson, 2003; 2007; Chahine et al., 2011). Moreover, we further explore the 
way how different types of founders influence the external resource acquisition 
performance. Our findings suggest that the strategic hybridization or diversity may be 
advantageous in some conditions; however, a clear and constant founder identity is 
still highly recommended for legitimating the business and attracting investors in IPO. 
Besides, cultural entrepreneurship research has emphasized the role of organizational 
identity in the resource acquisition process (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Navis & 
Glynn, 2011; Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011; Zhao et al., 2013), which suggests 
start-ups to convey an identity that conforms to a recognized collective identity 
category. Our findings further extend their framework by highlighting the importance 
of founder identity in constructing the whole organization image and also by pointing 
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out that organizations could build up a legitimate distinctive identity through 
specializing in one category dimension, while diversified in other groups of categories 
(Navis & Glynn, 2011; Durand & Kremp, 2016). 
In practice, our study provides a valuable suggestion to the potential entrepreneurs, 
who are willing to get their business list in the open market. As an entrepreneur, 
diversified experience may benefit you in the founding process of the business, and 
the broad skills and social ties may help to develop the business and get survival in 
the highly competitive market (Lazear, 2004, 2005). However, when facing to 
audiences, such as investors and customers, it’s better for the entrepreneur to highlight 
the category he is specialized in and build up a clear identity for both himself/herself 
and the company. Otherwise, the hybrid and unclear founder identity may create an 
obstacle, which hinders him and his company to be recognized and evaluated by 
investors and the market. Our work also suggests Jack-of-all-trades, who are totally 
hybrid across multiple categories, that getting support from outside experts would be 
a good strategy to reduce the penalty of their hybridization. 
Despite the contribution of our findings, there are still limitations to our analysis. 
Although our dataset spreads 12 years and includes most industries in the UK, our 
focus on IPO firms may also bring into question the generalizability of our findings. 
Indeed, only a small portion of entrepreneurial firms are eligible to be list in the open 
market, most of them need to raise money through other channels, such as from 
business angels, venture capitalists or borrowing from the bank. Whether the category 
imperative mechanism is also valid in other resource acquisition process should be 
further discussed and tested. Also, for some entrepreneurs who are famous before IPO, 
even though they have straddled multiple categories, they would still be recognized 
by investors. Whether a large amount of information about them in the open market 
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may weaken or strengthen the influence of categorization, is worth to be discussed in 
future studies. Furthermore, we only focus on the effect of founders’ category-
straddling behavior in the resource acquisition and do not include the information that 
whether the firm is specialist or generalist. Since they may jointly shape audience 
perceptions, the relationship of category-straddling behavior between founder and 
entrepreneurial firm, may also influence investors’ evaluation and thereby influence 
their resource acquisition. Future studies should discuss such interaction, as well as 
the audience response. Another limitation we should point out is that we don’t 
consider the influence of heterogeneity among audience in our study. As the 
differences in tastes and expectations of audiences may strongly influence their 
cognitive process and evaluation, how different types of audiences responding to the 
hybridity need to be further discussed in future studies (Wry, Lounsbury, & Jennings, 
2014; Paolella & Durand, 2015). 
41 
 
CHAPTER 3 SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO? POWER 
STRUCTURE AND FOUNDERS’ EXIT SOON AFTER AN IPO 
 
ABSTRACT 
  We study the founders’ decision to exit the venture they created soon after an initial 
public offering (IPO). Specifically, we distinguish between three exit options: 
founders that exit financially, selling all their shares but remain as employees; 
founders that exit managerially, leaving the top management team and the board of 
directors but keeping their ownership; and founders that exit completely. What factors 
drive founders’ different decision making of the exit routes after IPO? To answer the 
question, we adopt power theory (French & Raven, 1959; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996) to explain the variance in founders’ exit choices after an IPO. Our core thesis is 
that founders with reduced power during the turbulent time of the IPO will be more 
likely to exit the firm they created soon after it goes public. We study a novel, hand-
collected dataset of 313 founders from the total population of 177 entrepreneurial 
IPOs on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) between 2002 and 2010. We find that 
power structure is associated with founders’ total exit but does not equally well 
explain partial exits (i.e. financial or managerial). Moreover, we find that the effect of 
power on total exit is moderated by the type of capital market in which the IPO takes 
place [main market of the LSE versus Alternative Investment Market (AIM)].  
INTRODUCTION 
  The initial public offering (IPO) is an important event in the lifecycle of an 
entrepreneurial venture which entails crucial decisions for both entrepreneurs and 
investors (Bruton, Chahine & Filatotchev, 2009). The finance literature portrays the 
IPO as an important financing mechanism enabling the company to achieve growth. 
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Private firms that aim to grow and expand, ultimately go public to finance their 
investments (Bruton et al., 2009; Jain & Kini, 1999). At the same time, the 
entrepreneurship literature often considers the IPO as the ultimate ‘dream-exit’ (Baron 
& Shane, 2007). Once the company has been listed in the public market, there is an 
opportunity for initial investors and also founders to sell all or part of their 
shareholdings and leave the company (Prasad, Vozikis, Bruton, & Merikas, 1995). 
Most studies that consider the IPO as a potential exit strategy, focus on investors’ exit 
and are based on industry or company-level data (Bayar & Chemmanur, 2012; 
Cumming, Fleming, & Schwienbacher, 2006). Very little is known about when or why 
founders exit via an IPO (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012). Actually, entrepreneurial exit, 
which describes the process that entrepreneurs leave the firms they helped to create 
(DeTienne, 2010), is a major event in the entrepreneurial process from different 
perspective. For founders, exit represents the time of harvesting, when they see the 
value of all their hard work invested into the business. For the firm, the founders’ exit 
may represent a change in direction and even in organizational identity, which may 
also result in discontinuation or closure. For the economy, entrepreneurial exit allows 
entrepreneurs to free themselves from management and focus on new opportunities, 
which can further stimulate economic growth (Mason & Harrison, 2006; DeTienne, 
2010). The phenomenon of entrepreneurial exit has attracted increasing attention in 
recent literature (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; DeTienne, 2010; DeTienne & Cardon, 
2012; DeTienne, McKelvie & Chandler, 2015).  
  Our study aims to explore the factors that drive founders to exit soon after an IPO, 
utilizing the theory of power (Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; 
Nakauchi & Wiersema, 2015). In general, the IPO represents a time of change for the 
venture in terms of both operating control and business direction (Chahine & Goergen, 
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2011; Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998). Our main thesis is that founders who 
remain with less power at the time of the IPO are more likely to exit their venture at 
the first opportunity. More specifically, we argue that lack of power decreases the 
founder’s interest in the business, and can lead to voluntary exit. In addition, lack of 
power reduces control which can also lead to a push towards exit; founders can be 
encouraged to leave by investors in order to hire professional managers.  
  We build on early exploratory work by Boeker and Karichalil (2002) who test the 
determinants of founders’ exit on a sample of privately owned entrepreneurial firms. 
While this study explores a broad range of possible exit predictors, we adopt a single 
theoretical frame - the founder’s power structure (Finkelstein, 1992) – which fits our 
specific context of the IPO. Our theoretical focus on power is inspired also by studies 
on the effect of power structure on CEO succession (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Shen 
& Cannella, 2002; Zhang, 2006). We note though that founder’s exit differs from 
CEO succession, because founders are not just quitting a job; they usually have a 
major equity stake and an emotional attachment to their ventures. Moreover, unlike 
CEOs, IPO-founders typically make the exit decision during a period of growth, and 
for them exit totally from the venture is a voluntary decision; founders can be 
removed from the firm’s management but they cannot be forced to sell their shares. 
Founders also have the option of partial exit (reducing involvement while retaining 
some ownership and/or control), as we explain below.    
  We distinguish three exit choices connected to the IPO event. Founders may exit 
financially by selling all their shares to become employees of the venture; they may 
exit managerially, leaving the top management team and the board of directors but 
holding on to their shares; or they may choose to exit the venture totally 
(managerially and financially) by leaving the company completely. We study a novel, 
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hand-collected dataset of 313 founders from the total population of 177 first time 
listings of entrepreneurial firms on the main market of the London Stock Exchange 
and the Alternative Investment Market between 2002 and 2010. Binary and 
multinomial regression analyses are used to explore whether founders’ power 
structure is associated with the likelihood of exit and the specific exit choice. To rule 
out alternative explanations, we control for other personal, firm-level and market-
level factors that might influence the founders’ choice to quit their firm.  
Consistent with our main thesis, we find that founders with higher power at the time 
of IPO are less likely soon after (within 24 months from the end of their lock-up 
agreement) to exit completely from the venture they created. We find also that the 
relationship between power structure and total exit is moderated by the type of capital 
market in which the IPO takes place (LSE main market versus AIM). In other words, 
the relationship between founders’ power and total exit is contingent on the conditions 
prevailing in the institutional environment (in our case the stock exchange). 
Subsequently, we find that while power theory can explain total exit, it does not 
equally well explain partial exits (managerial and financial). Managerial exit (i.e. 
quitting management but retaining ownership) is associated with age and with the 
founder being a serial entrepreneur, indicating a lifestyle motivation. In turn, whether 
the IPO takes place in a ‘hot period’ is the main independent variable associated with 
financial exit (i.e. selling the shares but remaining on the top management team), 
indicating a financial motivation.  
  Overall, our study associates founders’ power at IPO with their likelihood of 
exiting the venture soon after IPO. Our findings indicate that multiple dimensions of 
founders’ power at IPO influence their exit options. We contribute to the literature on 
entrepreneurial exits (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012; Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne, & 
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Cardon, 2010) by introducing a new theoretical angle (power) to explain an important 
but empirically overlooked phenomenon, namely founders’ exit soon after the IPO. 
We contribute also to the power-succession literature (Boeker, 2002; Shen & Cannella, 
2002; Zhang, 2006) by extending its application to the interesting and novel context 
of entrepreneurial exit. We find support for the thesis that when people lose power 
over their project they are more likely to quit totally, terminating all association with 
their project. Interestingly, we find that this general thesis holds even in ‘extreme’ 
contexts of founders, namely actors who (i) initiated the project and therefore are 
emotionally attached to it, (ii) typically take the exit decision under positive-
performance conditions, and (iii) cannot be forced out completely since selling shares 
is a voluntary act. We find also that lack of power does not have an equally strong 
association with partial withdrawal from one’s own project. Partial withdrawal is 
related more to the actors’ life preferences and choices than to their losing control of 
their project. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The IPO as an Exit Route 
  The phenomenon of initial public offering has been researched extensively in both 
the finance and management disciplines. The finance literature deals mostly with the 
process and mechanisms of going public (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2001; Huyghebaert & 
Van Hulle, 2006) while the management literature investigates the managerial 
implications of going public, such as CEO change before the IPO (Jain & Tabak, 
2008) and venture capital exit (Lin & Smith, 1998). Pre-IPO CEO-succession is seen 
as a strategic choice forced top-down from powerful investors who may not have 
confidence in the founder’s ability to continue to grow the company further (Jain & 
Tabak, 2008; Wasserman, 2003). Interestingly, companies where the founders stay on 
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the board as CEO at the time of the IPO tend to achieve a better valuation (Certo, 
Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Nelson, 2003). 
  In general, the literature on IPO as a growth-financing event, identifies predictors 
of IPO success and performance; to date, there are no studies that examine the IPO 
through an entrepreneurial lens as a route to entrepreneurial exit (DeTienne & Cardon, 
2012: p.354). Since the IPO creates a liquid market for stock, entrepreneurs have an 
opportunity to exit from ownership. Moreover, in the growth phase after the IPO, 
founders might be replaced voluntarily or involuntarily, by professional managers. In 
this paper, we try to explain entrepreneurial exit soon after an IPO. We depart from 
the observation that the IPO event is a period of turmoil and negotiation which often 
changes the balance of power among the stakeholders (Fischer & Pollock, 2004). 
Founders can end up with limited power over other stakeholders such as investors, 
professional managers, and external board members. We submit that this power shift 
at the time of going public is a mechanism that might help to explain the phenomenon 
of entrepreneurial exit soon after the IPO.  
Power and Exit 
  Finkelstein (1992) adopts the French and Raven’s (1959) original concept of power 
and adapts it to empirical study of top management teams. Power is the capacity of 
individual actors to exert their will (Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 
1971; Pfeffer & Pfeffer, 1981). The power structure of executives has been shown to 
affect strategic decisions, organizational processes, and performance outcomes (Child, 
1972; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1996; Nakauchi & Wiersema, 2015). In particular, research shows that the greater the 
power of executives the lower the likelihood of their dismissal (Allen & Panian, 1982; 
Boeker, 1992; Ocasio, 1994; Weisbach, 1988). However, the literature focuses on the 
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effects of power on CEO dismissal in mature companies. Few studies (with the 
notable exception of the exploratory study by Boeker & Karichalil, 2002) examine 
how power structure might influence the founders’ decision to exit from the 
entrepreneurial firm that they set up.  
  Founders’ exit is an interesting and novel context for the theory of power, and for 
multiple reasons is a different phenomenon from CEO dismissal. Firstly, founders 
have a higher level of attachment to a company they have created than do professional 
managers who are hired to run it. Entrepreneurs also have greater need than employed 
managers for control over their firms (Wasserman, 2003). Moreover, the effect of 
power structure on CEO dismissal is usually considered under conditions of poor 
firm-performance (Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Shen & Cannella, 2002); whether power 
structure can explain founder exit during the growth period just after an IPO has been 
under-explored. In addition, the CEO succession literature mostly considers exit as 
involuntary, i.e. a CEO is dismissed by the board to be replaced by professional 
managers (Wasserman, 2003; Jain & Tabak, 2008). Our main dependent variable is 
founders’ total exit, which by definition, is a voluntary decision. While exit from 
management can also be forced on founders, simultaneous exit from ownership is 
voluntary.  
  In general, in being both the owner and manager gives founders more exit options 
than available to hired executives. Whereas top managers of mature companies hold a 
small number of shares acquired as part of their employment agreements, founders 
typically own a substantial proportion of the firm at the time of IPO (Wasserman, 
2003). Thus, founders can partially-exit financially (selling their shares but remaining 
on top management), partially-exit managerially (keeping the shareholding but 
quitting the board and the top management team) or exit completely (total exit). The 
48 
current literature on the effects of power on managerial exit does not consider the 
distinction between financial and managerial exit, or the concept of partial exit.  
Founders’ Power Dimensions and Total Exit Soon after IPO 
  In the following section, we establish theoretical links between the dimensions of 
founders’ power (structural, ownership, expertise and prestige power) and founders’ 
total exit from the business. Founder’s total exit involves cutting all ties with the firm 
(managerial and financial), and therefore, represents the most ‘clean’ exit route.  
  Structural Power refers to the power based on formal organizational structure and 
hierarchical authority (Brass, 1984; Hambrick, 1981). In the context of a venture 
going for an IPO, we submit that the CEO and the board chair have higher structural 
power relative to other managers (Finkelstein, 1992). The CEO is the top executive, 
responsible for the strategy and direction of the venture (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002). 
Similarly, the chair of the board can affect the venture by influencing the board of 
directors which is the ultimate decision-making body and represents the shareholders 
(Harrison, Torres, & Kukalis, 1988). Founders with high structural power at IPO 
(holding the positions of the CEO and/or chair of the board) have the opportunity to 
steer the company towards their vision which creates an incentive for them to stay. 
Founders with high structural power (CEO or board chair) play a central role in the 
company’s decision making, and therefore, it will be harder for investors to encourage 
them to leave and less likely.  
  Ownership power derives from the founders’ proportional shareholding 
(Finkelstein, 1992). Ownership helps founders to safeguard their managerial positions 
in the public company; founders with large shareholdings carry a lot of weight on the 
board, and can influence the important decisions such as potential founder dismissal. 
Also, investors often feel comfortable with founders-leaders with a large proportion of 
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the firm’s shares since it means their interests are aligned; founders with substantial 
ownership are more incentivized to strive for eventual success of the venture, and 
therefore, run less risk of being encouraged to leave by investors.     
  Expert power arises from the ability of founders to deal with environmental 
contingencies and contribute to the success of their companies (Crozier, 1964; 
Hambrick, 1981; Hickson et al, 1971; Mintzberg, 1983; Tushman & Romanelli, 1983). 
Whether founders have the expertise to run a publicly traded enterprise can influence 
their choice to stay rather than exit after the IPO. An IPO changes the operating 
requirements introducing rules, such as disclosure of financial and business 
information (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Price Waterhouse, 1995), and can transform 
the firm’s control and direction (Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998). Founders with 
limited expertise may feel less comfortable with managing a ‘grown-up’ venture, and 
may decide to exit voluntarily, or may lose the trust of the investors and receive 
pressure to leave. In contrast, founders with higher levels of expertise may feel 
confident of their ability to deal with the change and the company’s expansion. More 
specifically, if a founder is the inventor or main developer of the product he or she 
will enjoy special technical status in the company, making their replacement difficult. 
Industry experience is another executive characteristic usually linked to expert power 
(Datta, Guthrie, & Rajagopalan, 2002; Haynes & Hillman, 2010). Founders with more 
experience in the specific industry have better business and resource networks, are 
better equipped to steer the company through difficulties, and are considered more 
highly by the board and by investors (Bach & Smith, 2007; Cooper, Gimeno-Gascon, 
& Woo, 1994; Pennings, Lee, & Van Witteloostuijn, 1998); therefore, they are less 
likely to exit.  
  Prestige power derives from people’s status (prestige), which influences others’ 
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perceptions of their importance (Dalton, Barnes, & Zaleznik, 1968; Finkelstein, 1992). 
We expect that founders’ prestige power is related to their decision to exit their 
venture. Prestige enhances founders’ credibility and makes them legitimate leaders of 
the company (D’Aveni, 1990). Having links with prestige-enhancing external 
institutions (such as company boards and the media) helps founders to understand 
their environment and become more confident leaders. Moreover, high prestige 
founders benefit investors because they improve the market status of the company. 
For these reasons, high-prestige founders will be less likely to exit the company 
voluntarily, or be pressured to leave by investors. Founders can enhance their prestige 
power by participation in the boards of directors of other firms which signals that they 
belong to a renowned managerial elite. External board positions give the founder 
access to powerful external contacts who may provide information valuable to the 
founder’s own firm (Tushman & Romanelli, 1983). Another way for entrepreneurs to 
acquire prestige power is to gain popularity through the media. High profile founders 
become firm figureheads. This important role decreases the possibility they will drop 
out or be replaced.  
  Based on the above arguments about the relationship between various dimensions 
of power and total exit of founders we propose a broad hypothesis which includes 
four sub-hypotheses:   
  Hypothesis 1: The larger the amount of power held by a founder at the time of the 
IPO, in terms of a) structure, b) ownership, c) prestige, and d) expertise, the lower the 
likelihood that he or she will exit from the venture soon after the IPO. 
The Moderating Role of the Conditions of the Institutional Environment: Main versus 
Alternative Investments Market on the LSE 
  We propose that the institutional environment in which the IPO takes place 
moderates the relationship between founders’ power and their choice to exit soon after 
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IPO. We focus on the type of stock market as a tangible element creating variance in 
the institutional environment. The main market of the London Stock Exchange differs 
from the Alternative Investment Market in three important ways related to our 
phenomenon of founders’ exit. IPO firms in the main-market are more mature, face 
more regulation, and distribute fewer shares to a larger number of public investors 
than their counterparts in the AIM (Gerakos, Lang, & Maffett, 2011). We explain the 
impact of these differences in the succeeding paragraphs.   
  Entrepreneurial firms listed in the main (LSE) market are usually larger (more total 
assets and employees) and older compared to firms in the AIM market. Hambrick and 
Crozier (1985) showed that founders of companies that developed beyond their start-
up stage feel greater pressure and experience more difficulty in leading their 
companies. This pressure on founders-leaders can be exacerbated by the fact that the 
main market at LSE is a more regulated and less flexible environment in which to 
operate compared with the AIM. Leaders in the main market face more rules and 
constraints on management. For example, financial reporting is more stringent, visible 
and pressing for companies listed on the main market, and is closely monitored by 
financial analysts and investors (Gerakos, Lang, & Maffett, 2011). Moreover, 
founders-leaders in the main market typically need to report to larger boards that 
include more outsiders (Mallin & Ow-Yong, 1998, 2012). Such regulation and 
formalization in the institutional environment reduces the founders’ freedom and 
autonomy to make decisions, even if they are the CEO or board chair. Thus, structural 
power will have less influence on their behavior. We expect that operating in the main 
market will moderate the aforementioned association between the structural power of 
founders and their decision to exit their firms totally. Therefore, we hypothesize that:  
  Hypothesis 2: Going public in the main market of the London Stock Exchange (as 
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opposed to the AIM market) diminishes the negative association between a founder’s 
structural power (i.e. being a CEO or board chair) and the likelihood that he or she 
will exit totally from the venture soon after the IPO. 
  Another important difference between the main market and the AIM is the 
composition of investors. Most AIM-listed companies are early-stage start-ups which 
are risky for unsophisticated public investors. As a consequence, the AIM market is 
composed largely of experienced institutional investors and wealthy individuals 
(Mendoza, 2008) who buy larger numbers of shares compared to public investors 
trading in the main market. Concentration of investor shares in a small number of 
players represents a challenge to the founder’s ownership power; Investors with 
concentrated ownership can dominate decision making, and thus, moderate the effect 
of founders’ ownership power on organizational behavior (including the decision to 
exit). In contrast, founders’ ownership power is challenged less in a situation of a 
large number of minority shareholders and fragmented investors which is more 
typical of the main market.  
  Moreover, as discussed above, founders’ prestige-power plays an important role in 
legitimizing the company in the eyes of public investors (Chahine, Filatotchev, & 
Zahra, 2011), and thus reduces the likelihood of founders’ exit. However, this 
association may be weakened if the company is financed by more experienced and 
more professional institutional investors, i.e. if the IPO takes place on the AIM market. 
More sophisticated investors are influenced less by social evaluation signals such as 
prestige, and focus more on rational evaluations of the venture (Joe, Louis, & 
Robinson, 2009). In contrast, prestigious founders will be more important in the eyes 
of less sophisticated public investors in the main market, making the relationship 
between prestige and behavior more prominent. Based on the above mechanisms, we 
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hypothesize that: 
  Hypothesis 3: Going public in the main London Stock Exchange market amplifies 
the negative association between a founder’s ownership power (proportion of 
shareholding) and prestige power (directorships and media coverage), and the 
likelihood that he or she will exit the venture totally after an IPO. 
Founders’ Power and Partial Exit 
  As mentioned earlier, some entrepreneurs may choose partial exit from the venture 
after an IPO, giving up some of their involvement but retaining an association with 
the company. Specifically, founders can sell their shares but remain as a manager 
(financial exit), or resign from their managerial position but keep their shares 
(managerial exit).  
  We argue that the relationship between founders’ power at IPO and their choice of 
partial exit soon after the IPO is more complex, and generally weaker than the 
relationship between founders’ power with total exit. When actors feel frustration at 
becoming peripheral or marginalized, they will disassociate completely from the 
project; in simple terms, they want to “know nothing about it”, and exit totally.  In 
the case of partial exit, this is probably not a matter of frustration over loss of power 
and reduced influence over the project.  
  We argue that partial exit might be more of a personal decision to reduce 
involvement in one aspect of the project; in our context either the equity or the 
managing aspects of the business. In this case, the actors are happy and proud to be 
part of the project but in a more limited capacity better aligned to their personal 
circumstances and preferences. For example, founders who exit financially from the 
business, may be driven mostly by financial reasons; they want to cash in on their 
investment via the IPO. Founders who exit managerially might simply have tired of 
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leading and running the business but might remain excited about its future prospects 
and potential. Therefore, in the case of a partial exit compared to total exit lack of 
power is likely to have a smaller association with the exit decision. We formally 
hypothesize that:  
  Hypothesis 4: The relationship between founders’ power at IPO and exit after the 
IPO is weaker in the case of partial exit (either financial or managerial) than in the 
case of total exit. 
METHODS 
Data and Sample 
  We started with an initial sample of all UK companies that completed an IPO 
between 2002 and 2010 on the main market of the LSE market and the AIM market. 
We excluded from the list cases of re-admission and transfer from the AIM to the 
main market. We also excluded investment trust IPOs since these organizations have 
very specific governance characteristics and it can be difficult to identify the 
founder(s) (Chahine, Filatotchev, & Wright, 2007). In addition, we excluded IPOs 
representing de-mergers, equity carve-outs, reverse takeovers and equity 
reorganizations. We do not consider investment and acquisition vehicles since the 
original founders are no longer part of the companies they created. Since our research 
is focused on entrepreneurial exits, we excluded firms incorporated more than ten 
years before the IPO in order to ensure that the firms in our sample were still in the 
young, entrepreneurial phase of their life cycle (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003; 
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Talaulicar, Grundei, & Werder, 2005). Using 
company prospectuses, we identified and eliminated companies that appeared to be 
subsidiaries and spin-offs where it is not always possible to identify a founder or 
founding team (Jain & Kini, 1999; Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007). All of this resulted in 
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a final sample of 177 entrepreneurial firms and 313 founders. For each firm, we 
identified the original founders through information provided in the IPO prospectus. 
We used company websites and founders’ personal websites to complete the dataset. 
Dependent Variables 
  The dependent variable is a founder’s exit from the listed company within 24 
months after the lock up period. When a company’s shares are offered at IPO, insiders 
enter a lock up agreement. This is a contractual agreement between the existing 
shareholders and the underwriter that the shareholders will not sell a certain 
percentage of their shares for a specified period of time. UK lock-up agreements vary 
between 6 and 24 months, and founders are not allowed to exit the firm within that 
time interval (Espenlaub, Goergen, & Khurshed, 2001). We choose 24 months after 
the end of the lock-up period as a cut-off point to measure ‘founder exit soon after an 
IPO’. During the first 12 months following the end of lock up period, insiders can sell 
their shares only to the underwriter and on the open market. Thus, we assume that 
within 24 months after the lock-up period a founder realistically could sell all of his or 
her shares using the IPO as an exit route. A longer period would make the exit remote 
from the IPO which is our focal anchor event.  
  Entrepreneurs can exit the company financially, managerially or totally. We define 
total exit as cases of founders who leave the top management team and the board of 
directors and hold less than a 3% shareholding 24 months after the lock-up period. 
The 3% shareholding was the cut-off point because of the nature of our data; founders 
that do not work for the company do not usually appear in the annual report if their 
shareholding is under 3% (considered negligible by the investment community). We 
define as managerial exits cases of founders who leave the top management team 
(executives and senior managers as presented in the prospectus) and the board of 
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directors but hold 3% or more of shareholding, 24 months after the lock up period. 
Financial exit is defined as cases of founders who sell their shareholding within 24 
months of the lock up period but remain on the top management team or the board of 
directors.   
Independent Variables 
  The independent variables in our study are measureable proxies for different 
dimensions of the power held by founders at the time of the IPO. Most of the 
information for the coding was provided by the IPO prospectuses. To capture 
structural power, founders who were the CEO or Chair of the board at IPO were 
dummy coded 1 and 0 otherwise. Ownership power was approximated by the 
percentage of shares owned by the founder at IPO. To capture expertise power, we 
used two proxies: a) founders who were the inventor or the main developer of the 
product were dummy coded 1 and 0 otherwise; b) we measured relevant industry 
experience as the number of years that the founder worked in an industry related to 
the focal IPO firm, before founding his or her firm. Founders’ experience was based 
on the resumes in prospectuses, corroborated by information from company websites, 
and social media (e.g. LinkedIn). The relevance of industry experience was judged 
based on the super sector of the industry classification benchmark (ICB). We 
considered as relevant, industry experience in the same industry ICB super sector as 
the IPO venture (19 super sectors in total). Founder’s prestige power was captured by 
two proxies: a) number of directorships in other firms during the five years before the 
IPO, obtained from the IPO prospectus (Finkle, 1998; Higgins & Gulati, 2003); b) 
media coverage, which we calculated as the number of news items mentioning the 
founder together with his or her company. News data were obtained from the Nexis 
UK database which includes coverage in national and regional newspapers.  
Moderating Variable 
57 
  In addition to our independent variables, our theoretical framework includes a 
moderator. We dummy coded entrepreneurial IPOs listed on the LSE main market as 
1, and those listed on the AIM as 0 in order to explore how the conditions in the 
institutional environment influence the relationship between founders’ power and total 
exit.  
Control Variables 
  To rule out alternative explanations for founders’ exit decision, we included several 
control variables at three levels of analysis - individual, firm, and the industry and 
economy. At the individual level, founder’s age can be a determinant of founder exit. 
As founders get older, their energy levels may decline or they may simply want to 
retire which might increase the likelihood of exit. Since feelings of attachment to the 
company may differ between men and women (Rosenstein & Horowitz, 1996) we 
control for founders’ gender coding female entrepreneurs as 1, and male as 0. In 
addition, compared to other types of founders, serial entrepreneurs usually are more 
passionate about the initial founding process, and are familiar with selling their firm 
(Cardon, Wincent, Singh, & Drnovsek, 2009). We dummy coded serial entrepreneurs 
(founders who had exited from earlier companies) as 1, and 0 otherwise. Finally, 
within a founding team, other founders’ power may decrease the focal founder’s 
likelihood to exit if the team is united, or might increase the focal founder’s likelihood 
to exit if the team is divided; to take account of these possibilities we control for the 
share of ownership of other founders at IPO.  
  We control also for the characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm. As the firm 
develops, founders may become less qualified to manage it which increases the 
probability of founders’ exit (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002; Flamholtz, 1990). Therefore, 
we control for firm age measured as the number of months since incorporation of the 
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company, and firm size measured as the total assets at IPO. The performance of the 
firm, measured by annualized turnover growth in the three years before the IPO was 
also included in our models; increased financial performance might induce the 
founder to stay. Additionally, companies that received more private financing before 
the IPO often face higher pressure from their institutional investors to replace the 
original founders by a professional management team (Wasserman, 2003). Therefore, 
we include the proportion of ownership by institutional investors as a control variable. 
Moreover, board size might have an influence on the entrepreneur’s choice. On the 
one hand, larger boards include broader expertise which decreases the impact of 
individual founders, and therefore could facilitate exit (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002); 
on the other hand, larger boards with broader expertise could benefit performance 
which might encourage founders to stay on with the firm. Length of lock up period in 
months is controlled for since it might influence the founders’ decision to exit. We 
control also for stock performance measured by the annualized holding period return 
(HPR) between the time of IPO and 24 months after the lock-up period. We include it 
in our analysis to rule out the case of founder exit being driven by pecuniary benefits 
following an IPO (Jain & Kini, 1999).  
  We control next for the influence of the industry and the broader economy. 
Compared to traditional sectors, firms in growing and fast changing industries need to 
adjust their top management teams’ capabilities more frequently (Virany, Tushman, & 
Romanelli, 1992), which might increase the possibility of founder exit after IPO. We 
dummy coded firms operating in information technology (IT) and biotechnology as 1 
and 0 otherwise, since during the period of analysis those were rapidly growing and 
changing industries. Finally, we control for hot period effects in terms of IPO volume; 
we dummy coded firms which went public during 2004 and 2005 as 1 and 0 otherwise, 
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because the IPO volume was 52% higher in those two years than in the rest of the data 
period. 
Method of Analysis  
  We employ a binary probit model to test the main association between founders’ 
power and total exit after IPO, and to explore the moderating role of stock market 
type. We then use multinomial logit regression to explore the factors associated with 
founders’ partial exit, based on three categorical variables of financial exit, 
managerial exit and total exit as the dependent variables. This model compares the 
estimates for partial exits and total exit relative to staying in the business. In our 
sample, about 65% of founders were part of a founding team, and therefore share the 
same data for firm and industry/economy-level control variables with their business 
partners. To ensure valid statistical inferences, we apply a robust clustered standard 
errors estimation process to control for heteroskedasticity caused by data clustered by 
firm (Kennedy, 2003).  
RESULTS 
  Table 4 shows that 25.2% of founders exited totally from the business within 24 
months after lock-up period, 9.9% left its management but retained ownership, and 
5.4% of them sold all of their shares but continued to work in the company. 
  The descriptive statistics and pair wise correlations are presented in table 5. The 
average age of the 313 entrepreneurs in our dataset was 46.3 years, and 6.7% were 
female. The average ownership held by each founder was 15.8% at the time of the 
IPO. At IPO, 41.2% of founders held the position of the CEO or board chair.  
On average, founders had 13.4 years of work-experience in a related industry before 
founding the focal company. 13.7% of founders were the inventors or main 
developers of the firm’s product; 24% of founders started the company on their own 
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and 76% were part of a founding team. On average, founders had served on 7.3 
boards (other than the listed company) within the five years prior to the IPO. 29.4% of 
founders were serial entrepreneurs. And 6% of the entrepreneurs listed their firms 
first time in the main market of London Stock Exchange.  
 
Table 4 Entrepreneurial Exit Routes via IPO 
 
                      Selling 
out shares  
Leaving TMT 
No Yes 
No Continuation (59.4%)  Financial exit (5.4%) 
Yes 
Managerial exit 
(9.9%) 
Total exit (25.2%) 
 
   
Table 5 Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
Table 6 presents how the study’s set of predictors maps onto each exit route. We 
observe differences in the mean values of each power-dimension between the 
continuation and total exit routes. These differences in most cases, are less 
pronounced between continuation and partial exit (financial or managerial). This 
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descriptive analysis provides preliminary support for our predictions. For example, 
46.24% of founders who continued in the business were CEO and/or board chair at 
IPO, compared to 31.65% for founders who exited totally, and 35.29% for founders 
who chose partial financial exit; 17.20% of founders who continued to work in the 
business were the inventor or the main developer of the product, compared to 3.80% 
for founders who exited totally and 9.68% for founders who chose partial 
managerial exit. Founders who continued in the firm, on average held 17.90% of 
ownership at IPO, compared to 10.49% for founders who exited totally and 14.90% 
of founders who chose partial managerial exit. Founders who continued had an 
average of 14.66 years of working in a related industry; founders who exited totally 
had an average of 10.43 years and founders who chose managerial exit had an 
average of 14.24 years of experience in a related industry. Founders who continued 
served on average on 8.11 boards during the five years before the IPO, while 
founders who exited totally served on 5.48 boards and founders who exited 
financially served on 8.53 boards during the same period. Founders who continued 
were reported in the news 15.28 times compared to 11.73 times for founders who 
exited totally. We observe that our lifestyle predictors of exit show a different 
pattern. Specifically, being a serial entrepreneur peaks for managerial exit (48.39% 
versus 25.81% for continuation and 31.65% for total exit). The same pattern is 
observed for age; the average age of founders who exit managerially is the highest 
among all the categories (48.68 years versus 45.88 years for continuation and 47.29 
years for total exit). However, IPO in a hot period peaks for financial exit; 82.35% 
of financial exits involved an IPO in the hot period (2004-05), compared to 49.46% 
for continuation, and 55.70% for total exit.   
Tables 7 and 8 report the regression results. Model 1 in table 7 includes the 
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control variables which explain 8.4% of the variance in the dependent variable. 
Turnover growth before the IPO is the only statistically significant individual 
control variable (beta=-0.150, p<0.05), and has a negative association with 
founders’ total exit; this suggests that good pre-IPO performance induces the 
founder to stay in the company. The inclusion of the independent variables in model 
2 increases the model’s explanatory power significantly to 24.3% of the variance. 
The dummy variable for founder being a CEO or board chair has a negative 
association to total exit (beta=-0.305, p<0.1) and indicates that founders with 
structural power (CEO or board chair), on average, are 7.4% less likely to exit the 
company soon after the IPO. The proportion of the founder’s ownership at IPO has 
a negative and significant association to total exit (beta=-3.060, p<0.001); 
specifically, all else being equal, 1% more ownership at IPO is associated with a 
0.7% lower probability that the founder will exit the venture totally soon after the 
IPO.  
   Being the inventor or the main developer of the product (beta=-1.299, p<0.001), 
and having more experience in a related industry (beta=-0.028, p<0.01) have a 
negative and significant association with founders’ total exit. More specifically, being 
the main developer is associated to 31.4% decreased probability of total exit; and one 
additional year in a related industry is associated with a 0.7% reduced probability of 
total exit. These results suggest that expert power is related to a lower probability that 
the founder will exit totally from the business soon after the IPO. The model also 
shows a negative and significant association between the number of other 
directorships held by the founder in the five years before the IPO, and the probability 
of total exit (beta=-0.028, p<0.01); specifically, one extra directorship is associated 
to a 0.7% reduced probability of total exit. This indicates that prestige power is 
63 
related to a lower likelihood of founders’ total exit soon after the IPO.  
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Continuation 
Financial 
Exit 
Managerial 
Exit 
Total Exit 
Founder CEO/chairman 46.24% 35.29% 32.26% 31.65% 
Ownership at IPO 17.90% 19.50% 14.90% 10.49% 
Founder inventor 17.20% 29.41% 9.68% 3.80% 
Experience in related industry 14.66 12.12 14.24 10.43 
Other directorships 8.11 8.53 6.52 5.48 
Total news 15.28 5.24 8.58 11.73 
Serial Entrepreneur 25.81% 23.53% 48.39% 31.65% 
Founder Age 45.88 42.29 48.68 47.29 
IPO in the Hot Period 49.46% 82.35% 41.94% 55.70% 
 
Overall, our results provide support for hypothesis 1 (and its four sub-
propositions). With the exception of the non-significant results for media coverage 
(beta=0.006, p=0.9), all the other proxies for structural, ownership, expertise and 
prestige power have a significant negative association to total exit from the business. 
Model 3 tests the role of type of stock market (main LSE market versus AIM). 
First, we observe a direct relationship between market type and the decision to exit 
totally. Founders who negotiated an IPO on the main LSE market are (all else being 
equal) 77.9% more likely to exit totally from the business after IPO than if the IPO 
is negotiated in the AIM market (beta=4.149, p<0.01). This might be because in the 
main LSE market competition is more intense and the constraints are higher than 
those in the AIM market. Additionally, as predicted, the association between 
founder power and total exit differs between the main LSE market and the AIM for 
certain power-dimensions. Specifically, the interaction between structural power 
and IPO in the main market has a positive and significant association with total exit 
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(beta=3.481, p<0.001); this indicates that listing on the LSE moderates the negative 
association between founders being CEO or board chair, and total exit; this provides 
support for hypothesis 2. Moreover, the interaction between ownership power and 
IPO in the main market is negative and significant (beta=-88.160, p<0.001), 
indicating that ownership power is related more strongly to total exit in the main 
market compared to the AIM, as predicted by hypothesis 3. Regarding prestige 
power, the relationship between media coverage and founder exit is stronger for the 
main market (beta=-0.564, p<0.05) compared to the AIM. The difference in the 
two markets in the relationship between directorships and founders’ total exit is not 
significant according to Model 3 (beta=-0.110, p=0.3). Overall, hypothesis 3 is 
partially supported (for ownership and media coverage but not directorships).  
To allow visualization of the moderation results, we plotted the interaction effects 
between type of IPO market and the founder’s different power dimensions (figure 2). 
We observe that CEO or board chair founders are less likely (by 14.3%) to totally 
exit the company after going public in the AIM market. In contrast, for the main 
market the effect is reversed; founders are more likely (by 8.6%) to exit totally. 
Founder’s ownership has a negative association to the probability of total exit for 
both the AIM and the main market. However, an increase in ownership of 1% 
generates a sharper decrease in the probability of founders’ total exit in the main 
market (16.5%) compared to the AIM (7.0%). In terms of founders’ prestige power, 
a change of one article in media coverage of the founder has a minor effect on 
likelihood of total exit in the AIM (0.8%) but a significant effect in the main market 
(9.2%). In terms of other directorships, there is no major difference in the slopes, 
suggesting that the effects of directorships on founders’ total exit does not differ 
between the AIM and the main market (0.6% versus 2.4%). 
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We performed a multinomial-logit regression model to explore the factors 
associated to founders’ partial exit using the categorical variables of financial exit, 
managerial exit and total exit as dependent variables (see table 8). The first 
observation is that the multinomial model confirms the binary-regression results in 
terms of predicting total exit. The power dimensions are all negatively and 
significantly associated to total exit (as opposed to continuation), even in the 
presence of the partial exit categories, which increases our confidence in the 
previous results. Regarding financial exit (i.e. selling shares but remaining as a 
manager), we found that founders were 54.1% more likely to exit financially (than 
to remain with the firm) if they were male (beta=-12.915, p<0.001 for female 
founders), 7.7% more likely to exit financially of the company was listed on the 
main market (beta=2.454, p<0.05), and 7.7% more likely to exit financially if the 
company went public during a hot period (beta=1.923, p<0.05). Founders’ power 
dimensions generally have a non-significant association to financial exit with the 
exception of media coverage: one extra mention in the media reduced the likelihood 
of financial exit by 3.5% (beta=-0.862, p<0.05). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Binary Regressions on Total Exit 
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Figure 2 Interaction effects between power-dimensions and type of IPO market (main market 
vs AIM) on founders’ total exit 
    
   
  In relation to managerial exit, we found that founders were 8.7% more likely to quit 
their board position but keep their shares if they were serial entrepreneurs 
(beta=1.265, p<0.01). Older founders were more likely to choose managerial exit 
(beta=0.059, p<0.05). Specifically, one extra year of age is associated to a 0.4% 
higher probability of managerial exit. Importantly, founders’ power dimensions 
generally had a non-significant relationship to managerial exit with the exception of 
structural power; founder-CEO/chairman has a negative but marginally significant 
association with founder managerial exit (beta=-1.022 p<0.1); being CEO or board 
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chair is associated to a 6.2% lower probability of managerial exit.  
Overall, our analysis shows that the power dimensions typically have a non-
significant relationship with partial exit (both financial and managerial). Partial exits 
are associated to demographic and lifestyle factors (non-power related) such as gender, 
money (IPO in the main market, and during a hot-period), career-path (serial 
entrepreneurship) and age; we elaborate on these aspects in the discussion section. 
Overall, our results support hypothesis 4, suggesting that power is less relevant for 
explaining founders’ partial exit behavior (financial or managerial) compared to total 
exit. 
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Table 8 Multinomial Regression on Entrepreneurial Exit 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  IPO is a time of uncertainty for entrepreneurial companies and their founding teams, 
and is characterized by turnover in companies’ control and direction (Pagano, Panetta, 
& Zingales, 1998). An IPO represents an opportunity for the founders to raise funds to 
grow the business; it also offers them the chance to cash out and exit the venture. 
Interestingly, our data shows that less than half of entrepreneurs leave the company 
they created soon after IPO. Only 25.2% of the founders of IPO firms on the LSE exit 
their ventures totally within 24 months after the end of the lock-up period; 9.9% exit 
from the top management team but keep their shares; and 5.4% sell their shares but 
remain in the firm as an employed manager. Our study links founders’ power structure 
at the time of the IPO to the likelihood of their exiting the firm soon after the IPO, 
either totally or partially. 
   Consistent with our prediction, the results show that founders with less power at 
the time of IPO are more likely to exit totally soon after the IPO. Importantly, the 
results hold for multiple dimensions of power, namely structural, ownership, expertise 
and prestige power. This relationship between power and total exit is moderated by 
the institutional environment of the IPO. Specifically, a negative relationship between 
having structural power (i.e. being founder-CEO/board chair) and total exit is reduced 
in the main market (LSE) compared to the AIM. This may be because structural 
power is more likely to be constrained and challenged in the main market which is 
more strictly regulated, and on average, includes companies with larger boards and 
more independent directors. In contrast, the negative relationship between ownership 
and prestige power and total exit is increased for the main market of the LSE 
compared to the AIM. Since the main market is more fragmented than the AIM (i.e. a 
larger number of public investors own small equity holdings), ownership offers more 
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autonomy to founders, and prestige-signals matter more to investors. Thus, the 
relationship between ownership and prestige power and founders’ exit behavior is 
enhanced in the main market.      
   In addition, we find that power dimensions do not explain equally founders’ 
partial exit after the IPO. Only prestige power proxied by media coverage, is 
associated with financial exit. This might be because of the potentially negative 
market signals generated by a well-known founder selling his or her shares and 
remaining in a leadership position. Regarding managerial exit, only structural power 
(namely being CEO or board chair) prevents founders from leaving management but 
retaining their shares. That might be because founder-CEOs or board chairs are less 
likely to quit management since they enjoy more control over the business, and are 
too important to be dismissed easily by investors.  
   We found that founders’ partial exits are associated with lifestyle and 
demographic factors (unrelated to power) such as money, career objectives, age and 
gender. Specifically, financial exit is positively related to the IPO being in the main 
market (compared to the AIM), and with the offer coinciding with a hot period in the 
IPO market. These relationships point to financial motivations for exit; IPOs in the 
main LSE market and occurring during a hot period tend to produce higher returns for 
founders. Financial exit is related also to gender (males are more likely to exit 
financially) which can be also explained by the fact that males on average, are more 
motivated by and interested in making money than females (Cromie, 1987). However, 
managerial exit is related positively to founder age and a career as a serial 
entrepreneur. These relationships point to a lifestyle motivation for managerial exit. 
Older founders might be tired of running the business and happy to retire from 
management while retaining their shares and remain part of the business as an 
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investor. Serial entrepreneur founders will choose managerial exit to allow them to 
invest their time in a new venture.  
   Overall, we find that while total exit is related to power, partial exit seems more of 
a lifestyle decision. If the focal actors lack power and control over their project, they 
may become frustrated and disassociate from their project (total exit). Instead, partial 
disassociation (in our context financial or managerial exit) is caused not by frustration 
derived from lacking power but is a more conscious decision related to the actors’ 
preferences; namely how they see their lives in relation to their project.  
Theoretical Contributions 
   We contribute to the literature on entrepreneurial exit (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012; 
Wennberg, Wiklund, DeTienne, & Cardon, 2010) in three ways. Firstly, we examine 
an empirically overlooked phenomenon, namely founders exit after IPO. While the 
IPO is often positioned as a key exit route for founders (DeTienne, 2010; Wennberg & 
DeTienne, 2014) there is a lack of scholarly empirical work on this aspect and the 
drivers of the exit decision. Secondly, we introduce the concepts of financial and 
managerial exit, distinguishing partial from total exits. Thirdly, we bring in a specific 
and novel theoretical angle (power theory) to explain the exit decisions of founders 
soon after an IPO.  
  We contribute to the power-succession literature (Boeker, 1992; Shen & Cannella, 
2002; Zhang, 2006) by applying power theory to a novel, ‘extreme’ context, namely 
founders’ exit after IPO. In contrast to executives, founders at IPO are more attached 
to their firms since they initiated the project, typically take the exit decision under 
conditions of good performance, and cannot be forcibly removed because selling 
shares is voluntary. Moreover, founders have multiple exit options; they can exit 
totally or partially (financially or managerially). We find that while lack of power is 
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associated with total exit across four power-dimensions (structural, ownership, 
expertise, prestige power), partial exit is explained better by lifestyle and 
demographic factors such as money, career, age and gender. The broader implication 
of our empirical finding is that while lack of power can explain a focal actor’s total 
exit (possibly out of frustration) from the project he or she started, partial 
disassociation is related more to preference and lifestyle. This is a novel idea for 
power theory and should be tested in different business and management contexts, 
and in the broader sphere of human endeavor.  
Limitations and Further Research 
  This study advances knowledge about the relationship between power and exit but 
has certain limitations. Firstly, like other studies adopting a power perspective to 
explain managerial succession we cannot pinpoint the moment when the decision to 
exit was made by the founders. This implies that we cannot exclude reverse causality. 
For example, we cannot distinguish between cases of founders that made the decision 
to exit before the IPO and this influenced their structural power at IPO (being the 
CEO or board chair) from cases of founders whose structural power at IPO influenced 
their subsequent exit decision. Further field research is needed to distinguish these 
two scenarios. Hence, we cannot claim causality but simply provide evidence of 
association. In our defense, the other power dimensions, apart from structural power, 
could be considered exogenous from the IPO event; founder ownership is mostly 
determined by valuations, while expertise and prestige are built over the long term 
and are not related to the IPO.  
  Secondly, we focused only on IPOs on the LSE. Since we found differences 
between the main market and the AIM, we are conscious that the generalizability of 
our results to different geographies and public markets needs further evidence.  
Conclusion 
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  In this study, we explored why founders exit their venture soon after an IPO. 
Specifically, we advanced the thesis that lack of power over the business at the time 
of the IPO is related to founders’ total exit soon after. We found that this thesis holds 
for multiple dimensions of power, namely structural, ownership, expertise and 
prestige power. Interestingly, the strength of these relationships is contingent upon the 
conditions on the stock exchange in which the IPO takes place. Moreover, we found 
that lack of power does not have an equally strong association with partial exit from 
the business (financial or managerial); partial exits seems to be related to lifestyle and 
demographic motivators such as money, career, age and gender. We contribute to both 
the entrepreneurial exit literature (DeTienne & Cardon, 2012; Wennberg, Wiklund, 
DeTienne, & Cardon, 2010) and the power-succession literature (Boeker, 1992; Shen 
& Cannella, 2002; Zhang, 2006) by introducing a novel theoretical angle (power) to 
explain an overlooked phenomenon, namely founders’ exit after an IPO. 
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CHAPTER 4 WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO ME IF YOU LEAVE ME 
NOW? DOES POST-IPO EXIT OF FOUNDER AFFECT 
SUBSEQUENT FIRM-PERFORMANCE? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
  Exit of the main founder from a recently listed entrepreneurial firm might have 
both drawbacks and advantages. How does the leave of the main founder affect 
business performance after going public in general? Does it harm the business by 
bringing in more uncertainties and reducing investors’ trust? Or does the firm benefit 
from entrepreneurial exit through transferring to a more professional operation system? 
In this study, we empirically test the association between the main founder’s exit, up 
to five years post-IPO, and the firm’s subsequent performance. We study a hand-
collected sample of the main founders from the total population of UK entrepreneurial 
IPOs between 2002 and 2010. We find that while the post-IPO exit of the main 
founder is related to a short-term drop of the stock performance, in the long-term, 
founder’s exit is positively related with the firm’s financial performance.  
Keywords: Entrepreneurial exit, event study, post-IPO performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  Founder exit is a key event in the entrepreneurial process for two main reasons 
(DeTienne, 2010): first, exit represents the time of harvesting, when the founder is 
presented with the opportunity to cash in from all the hard work, time and energy 
invested into the business (Boeker & Karichalil, 2002); second, the departure of the 
founder may represent a change of direction and strategic orientation of the firm 
(Shen & Cannella, 2002), as well as an injection of new resources (Haveman & 
Khaire, 2004). In general, there is no doubt that the exit of the founder is a time of 
great uncertainty and brings with it considerable changes for the firm and its 
operations (Wasserman, 2003). Despite the recent scholarly attention paid to the 
phenomenon of entrepreneurial exit, there is still no consistent argumentation and 
evidence regarding the effect of the main founder’s exit on the subsequent 
performance of the firm.  
  The management literature seems to be divided into two camps. On the one hand, 
there is literature suggesting that the exit of the founder has a positive effect on the 
venture; after the start-up phase, firms reach a point where management style needs to 
move from informal and entrepreneurial towards more strategic and procedural (Daily 
& Dalton, 1992; Rubenson & Gupta 1992). Growing firms benefit from the 
replacement of the founder with a professional manager; this key event helps to set up 
more structured management processes, which can improve operation and increase 
investors’ trust in the firm’s potential (Wasserman, 2003; Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005). 
  On the other hand, there is literature suggesting that the founder’s exit has a 
negative effect on the firm’s performance (Haveman & Khaire, 2004). Entrepreneurial 
businesses are highly centralized and are usually over-dependent on their founders. In 
the case of the founder’s departure, the transition to professional management can 
77 
create uncertainty (Karaevli, 2007) and have a negative impact on the company 
(Hofer & Charan, 1984). Moreover, founders value their businesses more than 
professional managers and develop a higher level of attachment to their firms 
(Wasserman, 2003). Founders do not just manage the business but invest in it all their 
energy and entrepreneurial passion. Therefore, the replacement of the founder may 
hinder the development of the business and may ultimately lead to failure (Haveman, 
1993).  
  Most of the current empirical literature on founder-CEO succession focuses on the 
antecedents of succession (Haveman, 1993; Wasserman, 2003; Haveman & Khaire, 
2004); limited effort has been made to empirically test the consequences of founder’s 
exit on firm performance (except for Sam, 2003; Haveman & Khaire, 2004; Bamford, 
Bruton, & Hinson, 2006; Oertel & Walgenbach, 2012), especially the founder’s exit 
effect on a post-IPO venture. Our study aims to elucidate this point by testing for both 
short-term and long-term effects of founder’s post-IPO exit on firm performance. We 
focus on a single ‘main founder’ for each company (the CEO, Chairman of the Board, 
main inventor and/or major shareholder, in sequence). Since main founders play a 
prominent, figurehead role and are often mentioned in prospectuses and news feeds 
from the London Stock Exchange, we propose that their exits are visible and 
influential to firm performance. 
  We have selected post-IPO firms as our target population because the IPO event 
provides a large amount of external resources to trigger the rapid growth of the 
business, and also gives entrepreneurs the opportunity to cash-out and leave the 
company (Brau, Sutton, & Hatch, 2010). Additionally, being listed in the public 
market enables more visibility to the event of founder’s exit. Moreover, the IPO 
makes it possible to compare between the effects of founder exit on short-term stock 
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performance and on long-term financial performance.  
  We also build on the literature concerning the effects of CEO succession on firm 
performance (Furtado & Karan 1990; Khurana & Nohria, 2000; Shen & Cannella, 
2002). The CEO, like the main founder, is a critical player in the organization, who is 
able to direct the company in the pursuit of business opportunities (Barnard, 1938) 
and control the strategy and structure of the business operation (Woodward, 1980; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967). CEO succession may affect the 
company’s performance through strategic change, market entry and investment (Berns 
& Klarner, 2017). However, the relationship between CEO succession and venture 
performance remains inconsistent in the past empirical literature. Some studies argue 
that CEO succession may improve performance, since successors are more 
adventurous (Beatty & Zajac, 1987). Others find a negative association between CEO 
succession and venture performance, especially when the announcement of the 
departure is unexpected (Worrell, Davidson, Chandy, & Garrison, 1986; Graffin, 
Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013).  
  In any case we believe that founders’ exit is significantly different than the exit of 
the CEO (Wasserman, 2003). As the initial architect of the company, the main 
founder’s identity is even more tightly linked to that of the firm (Dobrev and Barnett, 
2005); compared to professional CEOs, founders usually have a larger amount of 
ownership, a closer relationship with the top management team and therefore a 
stronger control over the board. The founder also holds a clear vision of the future 
direction of the business; therefore their exit is likely to cause greater shock inside 
and outside the company. For example, the annualized return of the Apple stock 
slipped down from 32% to 19% after the departure of Steve Jobs (Stoffel, 2013). 
  Our results show that even though the main founder’s exit generates a negative 
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signal and negatively affects stock performance in the short-term, it benefits the post-
IPO financial performance of the business in the long-run. We contribute to the 
literature on entrepreneurial exit by identifying the effects of founder’s exit during a 
more mature stage of the business, namely post-IPO. Specifically, we differentiate 
between the anticipated and the real effects of the founder’s exit on the post-IPO 
company performance. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
  The existing management literature has developed a number of theoretical 
arguments discussing the relationship between founder/CEO exit and subsequent 
company performance, which can be either positive or negative. We now review both 
arguments separately.  
The Positive Effect of Founder Exit 
  Some scholars have argued for a positive relationship between founder exit and 
subsequent firm performance (Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Wasserman, 2003). They 
suggest that entrepreneurial succession could be an invigorating and revitalizing 
process for the firm (Haveman & Khaire, 2004). The rapidly growing firm may soon 
outpace its founders’ managerial capabilities (Buchele, 1967; Tashakori, 1980; 
Drucker, 1985; Clifford & Cavanagh, 1985) and the replacement of the founder with a 
professional manager may help to improve the management skills of the top 
management team (Flamholtz, 1986; Boeker & Wiltbank, 2005; Wasserman, 2003). 
Firms that have just been listed on the public market are confronted with rapid 
expansion, transitioning into larger, more structured organizations. Founding 
entrepreneurs are usually less experienced in dealing with such a high level of 
uncertainty and formalization, whereas professional managers are better equipped to 
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lead this type of company (Shirokova & Knatko, 2008). 
  The founder’s exit may also provide the firm with the opportunity to bring in new 
resources and energy (Haveman & Khaire, 2004). The new professional managers 
may infuse the business with more recent information about the market and the 
product, which will boost product development and promotion of the business, thus 
enhancing the company’s performance (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Haveman & Khaire, 
2004). In terms of financial resources, the founder may exit the firm after IPO by 
selling out the shares to a larger business group or to new institutional investors. 
Particularly in the case of a firm with financial difficulties, the founder’s exit may 
help the firm acquire external social capital, which will facilitate the recovery and 
further development of the company (Hambrick & Crozier, 1985). For example, 
Chung Ju-Yung, the founder of South Korea’s largest conglomerate, Hyundai, stepped 
down from the CEO position in 2000 due to the firm’s financial difficulties, 
apparently caused by its inflexible family-run management and nepotism. The news 
of Chung’s exit cheered the Korean stock market and the firm negotiated a financial 
package with creditors to reform and restructure (BBC, 2000).  
  Moreover, in most entrepreneurial businesses where the founders hold a large 
amount of ownership, the management system is highly centralized. In such cases, the 
founder’s exit will also push the venture to develop a more decentralized control 
system, which is necessary for the growth of a gradually maturing business (Greiner, 
1972; Rubenson & Gupta, 1990).  
Given these arguments, we hypothesize that, 
  H1a: Founder’s exit after IPO will be positively associated with firm performance. 
The Negative Effect of Founder Exit 
  Despite the well-known and widely accepted literature suggesting that founder’s 
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exit has a positive effect on firms, an alternative stream of literature supports the 
theory that there is no significant difference in performance between founder-
managed and professional-managed firms (Willard, Krueger, & Feeser, 1992). In fact, 
some existing studies support the view that the founder’s exit may negatively affect 
the firm’s operation and performance.  
  According to Carroll’s “succession-crisis hypothesis” (1984), the death rate of an 
organization increases following the exit of the founder because the successor, in an 
attempt to reform the business, may change work routines and increase employees’ 
insecurity, thereby generating a temporary operational crisis. Such crises tend to be 
more intense when the business is highly centralized (Carroll, 1984). Additionally, 
when the founder is pushed out due to the firm’s poor financial performance, the 
successor will face higher pressure to execute, which in turn will destabilize the 
relationships within the top management team (Puffer & Weintrop, 1991). 
  Although founder’s exit provides entry opportunities for new investors, the 
transition may create uncertainty, which in turn may prevent investors’ engagement. 
The exit of the founder may signal a lower confidence in the future of the business, 
which will thereby reduce investors’ trust in the business (Nelson, 2003, 2007). 
Additionally, in most negotiation cases, external financial institutions negotiate 
directly with the main founder; the founder’s departure may therefore lead to broken 
communication and the loss of external resources (Carroll, 1984).  
   As the initial architect of the firm and the team leader, the main founder’s identity 
is tightly linked to the organization’s image (Dobrev & Barnett, 2005). Therefore, the 
founder’s exit may generate an image crisis of the public company in the open market. 
For example, when Steve Jobs announced that he was to quit the managerial board of 
Apple, plenty of customers and investors questioned the creativity and future 
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performance of the company (Waters, 2011). 
  Another negative effect of the founder’s exit on the post-IPO firm is the shift away 
from the entrepreneurial orientation of the business; entrepreneurial orientation is 
considered to contribute to the post-IPO survival and performance of the firm since it 
highlights newness, responsiveness and boldness (Miller, 1983), which benefits the 
growth of the business in a rapidly changing environment (Mousa & Wales, 2012; 
Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin, & Frese, 2009). Founders, who have a vision of the 
business’s future and enjoy power inside the organization, are more willing than 
professional managers to develop high-risk strategies and pursue a more 
entrepreneurial orientation after IPO (Mousa & Wales, 2012). On the contrary, 
professional CEO’s tend to pursue a more conservative business strategy, which may 
prevent the fast growth of the newly listed company. 
Hence, we hypothesize: 
  H1b: Founder’s exit after IPO will be negatively associated with firm performance. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample and Data Sources 
  To test our hypotheses, we constructed a sample of entrepreneurial firms that 
completed IPO in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and in the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) between 2002 and 2010. Since our research focuses on 
entrepreneurial exit, we included only companies that were less than 10 years old at 
the time of IPO in order to ensure they were still in the young, entrepreneurial stage 
(Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Taulaulicar, 
Grundei, & Werder, 2005). In line with previous IPO studies, we excluded all IPOs 
that represented de-mergers, equity carve-outs, reverse takeovers and equity 
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reorganization. IPOs of investment trusts were excluded for their specific governance 
structure, and also because it would be difficult to identify a founder (Chahine, 
Filatotchev, & Wright, 2007). Investment and acquisition vehicles were also excluded 
since the original founders were no longer with the business at the time of IPO. We 
also eliminated subsidiaries and spin-offs, since it is not always possible to identify 
their founders (Kroll, Walters, & Le, 2007).  
  To test the effect of founder exit on long-term performance, we gathered panel data 
for six years starting at the time of IPO, resulting in a final sample of 168 firms and 
856 firm-year observations. In the case of multiple founders, we selected the main 
founder for each company, who had at least one of the following roles: CEO, 
chairman of the board, main inventor and major shareholder. The main founders play 
prominent roles in the founding and development of the focal firms and hence their 
exits should be visible and impactful.  
Dependent Variable 
  Firm performance. To test our hypotheses, we assessed both the short-term effects 
of founder exit on the stock price and the long-term effects of founder exit on 
financial performance. To measure the short-term reaction of stock market investors, 
we computed the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the firm stock three days 
before and following the announcement of the founder exiting the venture. To explore 
the effect of founder exit on the long-term performance of the firm, we used the 
annual return on assets (net income/total assets) from the year of IPO and five years 
post-floatation to measure the post-IPO operating efficiency of the firm (Gerakos, 
Lang, & Maffett, 2013; Espenlaub, Khurshed, & Mohamed, 2008). 
Independent Variables 
  The main predictor in our analysis was the main founder’s exit after IPO. We 
accessed publicly available information from the IPO prospectuses and the published 
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annual reports, and dummy-coded main founders who departed the board of directors 
as exits. We considered departing the board as entrepreneurial exit since the directors 
make major decisions about the company. According to the requirements of the LSE, 
any change in the board of directors must be announced publicly, providing us a 
possible way to explore the short-term reaction of the stock market after the 
entrepreneurial exit event. 
Control Variables 
  At the firm level, we controlled for: the size of the company (calculated as the 
logarithm of a company’s total assets); the annual turnover; the age of the company; 
and the capital structure, which was measured by the debt ratio (total debt/total 
assets); the effects of which on the firm performance have been consistently proved in 
the previous studies (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996; 
Karaevli, 2007; Andres, 2008). The size of the board was also included in the 
regression since a large board may increase the managerial ability of the 
entrepreneurial firm and thereby improve its performance (Kroll, Walters, & Le, 
2007), but it may also constrain the influence of the individual founder over the 
company. At the founder level, we dummy-coded for main founders that were the 
CEO during the year of their exit as the departure of a founder-CEO may generate 
large influence over the company’s performance. We also controlled for the main 
founder shareholdings each year, since the amount of ownership the founder holds 
may indicate his confidence in the firm’s performance. Moreover, to control for 
general changes due to economic conditions in each year, we included year dummy 
variables (2003-2015). 
Methods of Analysis 
  Event study. We performed an event study to explore the immediate effect of 
founder exit on stock performance. This method has been shown to be a powerful tool 
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to assess the financial impact of corporate change in both finance and management 
literatures (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; Wade, Porac, Pollock, & Graffin, 2006). In 
event studies, determining the exact timing of the event of interest is critical. 
Therefore, following the leading literature on this method we developed a 
conservative measure of exit in order to make sure that the effect on the stock price 
was not “contaminated” by events other than the founder’s exit (McWilliams & Siegel, 
1997). Specifically, we first identified the announcement date of the founder exit 
through Bloomberg. We defined founders’ exit as news of “Directorate Change”, 
announcing the founder’s exit from the board. For example, on 15 November 2007, 
Dr. Paul Johnson left Cyan Holdings Plc, which he founded. The company issued the 
news about his departure as follows:  
  “Board Change: Cyan Holdings Plc (AIM:CYAN.L), the fabless semiconductor 
company specializing in the development of low power consumption, configurable 
microcontroller chips, announces that Dr. Paul Johnson, Founder, President and CTO, 
has resigned with immediate effect from the Board of Cyan and as a director of the 
Company. Dr. Johnson founded Cyan in November 2002 and was CEO and CTO up 
to the recent reorganization and appointment of Kenn Lamb as CEO...The Board 
wishes Paul every success for the future.” 
  To avoid systematic bias caused by confounding events, we dropped the cases of 
firms that announced the founder exit together with other financial and/or 
management information, such as annual report, acquisition and/or other board 
changes; we also dropped from the sample firms that issued other news within the 
seven-day window surrounding the announcement of the departure of the founder (3 
days before and 3 days after that announcement). A shorter event window may not 
have been enough to capture the significant effect of the event, while a longer window 
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might have increased the risk of confounding effects (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
Following this selection procedure, we finally identified 42 cases qualified for the 
founder exit event analysis.  
  We applied the market model, in which a firm’s return is related to a market 
portfolio (in our case, the FTSE AIM All-Share index). Using daily returns, we 
estimated a regression model over the estimation period (ending 23 days before the 
event and extending back to 150 days prior to the event) to predict each firm’s 
expected normal returns. The abnormal returns during the event window were 
calculated by subtracting the expected returns from the actual returns. Finally, T-
statistics were used to test whether the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a 
selected event window were significantly different from 0. 
  Panel regression. To test the long-term effect of entrepreneurial exit, we applied a 
panel regression model. After a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978), we decided to use a 
fixed-effects model, which controls for the constant difference across firms. We did 
not include industry dummies in our model, since industry sectors for all the firms 
were constant during the study period, and therefore had already been controlled in 
the fixed-effects model. 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Analysis 
From 2002 to 2015, 13.7% of the main founders left the board within five years of 
getting the company public, and 21.4% of the main founders were still substantial 
shareholders (with 3% or more ownership). At the time of IPO, most entrepreneurial 
firms operated at a loss (ROA= -70.4% on average), while they made a great 
improvement during the five years after the IPO event (ROA=0.2%). The average 
87 
total assets held by the entrepreneurial companies at the time of IPO was 2.4 million 
GBP, and this number increased to 11.3 million GBP after five years. The average age 
of the companies at IPO was 4.8 years, while the average age of the main founders 
was 46, and 53% of them held the CEO position. On average the founders in our 
sample held 19.5% ownership of the business at the time of IPO and this number 
reduced to 12.7% after five years. The average size of the boards in our sample was 
5.5, and did not change substantially over the period of observation. These figures 
suggest that founders were still major shareholders in most post-IPO firms. 
Meanwhile, the ratio of total liabilities of the ventures decreased from 85.3% on 
average at time of IPO to 47.1% five years later, suggesting an improvement in 
financial status of most companies during the observation period. 
 
Table 9 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
 Variable          Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Return on assets -0.42 1.43          
2 
Founders exit within 5 
years after IPO 0.14 0.34  -0.04        
3 Founder CEO 0.49 0.50 0.10** -0.37***       
4 Founder‘s ownership 0.16  0.18 0.06+ -0.28*** 0.27***      
5 Total assets a 15.80  1.70 0.38*** -0.06+ 0.12*** -0.13***     
6 Turnovera 13.40 4.98 0.22*** -0.04 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.41***    
7 Company age a 1.81  0.55 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.07* 0.11** 0.32*** 0.46***   
8 Size of the board a 1.70  0.29  0.05 -0.15*** 0.05 0.11*** 0.33*** 0.08* 0.07*  
9 Debt ratio 0.56 0.81  -0.54*** -0.00 0.01 0.11*** -0.30*** 0.08* -0.05 -0.06+ 
     
   Tables 10 presents the results of the event analysis. It shows a significant negative 
reaction of the stock market toward the news that the main founder left the board after 
IPO. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) within the seven-day event window was 
-8.6%. To further investigate the effect of exit on stock performance, we examined 
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daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns over different event windows. 
As Table 10 shows, none of the cumulative abnormal returns were significant in the 
three days before the announcement of founder exit, suggesting that there was no leak 
of pertinent information before the event. During the three days following the day of 
the announcement of founder’s exit, we found that the stock market did not have a 
significant reaction for the intervals from 0 to 1 day and 0 to 2 days, indicating that 
the market took time to react to the event. However, on the third day after the 
announcement, the uncertainty raised by the founder’s exit triggered fluctuation of the 
stock and produced a significant negative return (-2.8%). The magnitude of the effect 
is considerable; in comparison, the stock return after a new CEO appointment event 
increases by 1% (Graffin et al, 2013).   
Table 10 Excess Market Returns Surrounding the Announcement of Founder Exit 
 
 
Multivariate Panel Regression Analysis 
  Table 11 shows the fixed-effect panel regression estimates of founder’s exit on 
   
 Exit of the founder after IPO 
Days Abnormal Return t 
Cumulative abnormal returns   
-3 to 3 -8.6% -2.21* 
-3 to -1 -2.6% -1.55 
0 to +1 -3.7% -1.44 
0 to +2 -3.2% -1.17 
0 to +3 -6.0% -1.80+ 
Daily abnormal returns   
-3  -0.5% -0.98  
-2 -1.2% -0.93 
-1 -0.9% -1.44 
0 -3.6%  -1.42 
1 0.0% -0.06 
2 0.4% 0.92 
3  -2.8%  -2.95** 
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return on assets. Model 1 examines the control variables, while Model 2 examines the 
relationship between founder’s exit and return on assets.  
  As Model 1 shows, firms with larger assets and lower debt ratio were significantly 
more profitable at the post-IPO stage. Meanwhile, firms whose founder held a larger 
proportion of ownership tended to generate better performance. However, and against 
our expectations, the size of the board had a marginally negative effect on the 
performance of the firm; this might have been caused by poor and ineffective 
communication between members in large boards (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; De Andres, 
Azofra, & Lopez, 2005). In terms of the effect of the main founder’s exit, we found 
that, compared with firms whose founder was still in the board, businesses whose 
founder had departed gained significantly more profit (0.42% more on average). In 
contrast to our findings in the event analysis, the advantages of founder’s exit 
overcame its negative consequences and produced a significant positive effect in the 
long-run.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 Results of Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis for Post-IPO performance 
 
Variable 
Return on assets 
(1) (2) (3) 
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Main Founder exit after IPO  0.423* 0.032 
  (0.194) (0.214) 
Founder CEO 0.065 0.227 0.255 
 (0.164) (0.179) (0.177) 
Founder's ownership 1.546* 1.816* 1.872** 
 (0.754) (0.762) (0.753) 
Turnover a 0.015 0.017 0.013 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Total assets a 0.134* 0.135* 0.146* 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) 
Age of the company a -0.164 -0.234 -0.211 
 (0.277) (0.278) (0.274) 
Borad size a -0.461+ -0.401+ -0.355 
 (0.240) (0.241) (0.238) 
Debt ratio -0.986*** -0.988*** -1.057*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) 
Main Founder exit after IPO 
* Debt ratio   0.703*** 
   (0.168) 
Y2003-2015 …… …… …. 
Constant -0.949 -1.105 -1.304 
 (0.928) (0.928) (0.918) 
R-squared 0.348 0.352 0.369 
 
  Additionally, we explored the moderating effects of the debt to assets ratio on the 
exit to performance relationship. Model 3 shows that the coefficient of the interaction 
between the main founder’s exit and the debt to assets ratio was statistically 
significant and positive. The association between the main founder’s departure and 
the company’s performance after IPO was negligible when the business operated 
under a low debt-to-assets ratio. Conversely, under a high debt to assets ratio the 
benefit of the main founder’s exit became significant. In other words, the departure of 
the main founder might help to reduce the negative effect of a large debt-to-assets 
ratio on a firm’s performance. In real terms, when the debt-to-assets ratio of a 
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company increases by 1%, the main founder’s exit would reduce its negative effect on 
return on assets by 0.7%. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
  The IPO is an important time for entrepreneurial companies, providing them with 
opportunities to raise funding and to grow, but it also offers founders an opportunity 
to cash-out and exit from the venture. The main founder’s exit may leave the 
company in a situation of uncertainty, while the arrival of a new CEO may bring 
disruptive change to the control and direction of the company (Pagano, Panetta, & 
Zingales, 1998). Our literature review revealed an inconsistency in relation to the 
effects of founder’s exit. We therefore attempted to present the advantages and 
disadvantages of founder’s departure and then we empirically tested the association 
between exit of the main founder’s and firm performance in post-IPO companies.  
  Our findings show that, in the short-term, the exit of the main founder after IPO 
generates a significant negative signal in the eyes of the investors, which lowers the 
firm’s stock return. However, in the long run, the firm benefits from the main 
founder’s departure possibly because a new leader generally helps to improve the 
business’s performance and profitability. This is true particularly for firms that operate 
under unfavorable financial conditions (high debt to assets ratio) after IPO. In other 
words, the exit of the main founder might provide a way to introduce new investors to 
the business, whose participation may help to diffuse the financial crisis and improve 
the performance of the company.  
  Overall, although the uncertainty generated by the founder’s departure may reduce 
the confidence of investors and create a short-term crisis for the company in the stock 
market, the transition to professional management still benefits the public firm in the 
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long-run.  
Theoretical Contribution and Implication 
  Our review of the literature revealed inconsistent arguments regarding the 
relationship between founders’ exit and firm performance. Our study adds to the 
existing literature by empirically testing this relationship in companies shortly after 
IPO. Most importantly, we contribute to the entrepreneurial exit literature by 
comparing the short-term effect of founder’s exit on the stock value with its long-term 
effect on the financial performance of the firm. By doing this we emphasize the 
difference between anticipated and real effects of the main founder’s exit on the 
business’s performance. Existing literature only focuses on the influence of founder 
exit on the real operation of businesses in the long-run, but overlooks its short term 
effects on the stock price. Even though investors may question the operational ability 
of the entrepreneur to continue running the business after the firm is listed, the main 
founder’s continued engagement still helps to maintain outsiders’ confidence in the 
future development of the business. Our findings recognized the role of the founder’s 
identity in constructing and maintaining the image of the business in the market, even 
after the firm’s transition to a public company, and thus that the main founder’s exit 
may greatly increase the uncertainty of investors. Second, we demonstrated the role of 
the financial condition of a company in moderating the relationship between founder 
exit and firm performance after IPO. The influence of founder exit is found to be 
significantly different between firms operating with low and high debt to asset ratios. 
These findings could provide an explanation for the contradictory arguments of past 
studies and thereby help us better to understand the mechanism of founder exit. It may 
also help to encourage scholars to further explore the conditional effects of founder 
exit.  
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  In practice, for listed companies, the departure of the founder signifies a transition 
of the business from entrepreneurial to professional management. This transition 
involves changes in operating procedures, management structure and organizational 
identity. The process involves risk and uncertainty, which reduces the confidence of 
public investors and thereby creates a short-term fall of the company’s stock. A 
possible strategy for avoiding this problem would be to issue distinct, positive news 
about the company together with the announcement of the founder’s exit. On the other 
hand, founder exit and the transition to professional management will actually 
contribute to the post-IPO survival and performance of the company in the long-term, 
since a fast-growing business will soon outpace the founder’s managerial capabilities; 
compared with entrepreneurs, professional managers are more capable of organizing 
mature public companies, and their affiliation will also benefit post-IPO companies 
by bringing in more resources. Moreover, founder exit provides an efficient way to 
reduce firms’ debt burdens, which also contributes to business performance after IPO. 
Limitations and Further Research 
  Even though this study advances our knowledge of the effect of founder exit after 
IPO, it still has limitations. Our study only discusses the association between the 
founder’s exit and the business’s performance in general, and simply explores the 
moderating role of the financial condition of the business after IPO. More studies are 
needed to further differentiate the benefits and drawbacks of the founder’s exit for 
different conditions of the business, as well as to consider the effects of different 
founders’ characteristics, in order to better understand the entrepreneurial exit 
performance mechanism. Meanwhile, our study only discusses the effect of founders’ 
managerial exit, but entrepreneurs actually have multiple exit routes after IPO: they 
can leave the board but still hold a large amount of ownership, transferring themselves 
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to the role of an investor; they can quit their entrepreneurial role by selling their 
shares and become an employee in the group; or they can exit the business totally and 
completely cut their relationship with the company. Whether different exit routes may 
generate different effects could be further discussed. Finally, our study on the effects 
of founder exit may also bring into question the generalizability of our findings. 
Indeed, we focused on UK entrepreneurial firms and further tests could be run on 
entrepreneurial firms listed in other cultures and markets. 
95 
CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION 
 
MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS 
  As an important event in the lifecycle of the entrepreneurial ventures, IPO not only 
provides the external financial resources necessary for the further growth of the start-
ups, but also generates a “dream-exit” route for entrepreneurs and other investors.    
Taking the importance of IPO in the process of the venture growing, increasing 
management and entrepreneurship literature tried to explore and discuss the IPO 
activities from different perspective. However, based on our literature review, limited 
effort has been made to explore how different types of founders may influence 
external resource acquisition via IPO. And very little is currently known on the 
factors that drive the founders leave the venture after IPO and how founder exit may 
affect the post-IPO operation of the business. This dissertation aims to fill these gaps 
and contribute to a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of external resource 
acquisition and entrepreneurial exit via IPO. 
  Entrepreneurs can be categorized according to their industry background as well as 
their functional background. In line with the previous literature, we found in chapter 2, 
that founders who span categories within each dimension separately face a penalty for 
being hybrid, in terms of raising money for their firms via IPO. However, audience 
cannot evaluate individuals based on each category dimension totally separately. 
When audiences face a multi-dimensional classification, they are less likely to isolate 
perceptions of categories from each other, and more likely to perceive them 
simultaneously (Paolella & Durand, 2015). Our empirical analysis found that 
founders who span categories across both dimensions of categories are the worst 
performers, whereas firms with the fully specialized founders performs best in the 
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fund raising via IPO. Most importantly, we found that firms with partially specialized 
founders (specialized either in industry or function) perform significantly better then 
firms with fully hybrid founders in the IPO, while not worse than the firms founded 
by the fully specialised entrepreneurs. This finding suggests that specializing in one of 
the two category dimensions helps to reduce or even eliminate the founders’ penalty 
of hybridity along other dimensions. Meanwhile, we found that VCs retaining more 
equity has positive effects on the ability of IPO firms to secure capital in those firms 
whose founders are fully hybrid, suggesting that an external expert endorsement can 
help to offset the penalty of hybridity, especially when hybridity occurs along 
multiple dimensions.  
  Except for providing external funds for venture growth, IPO also represents a time 
of high uncertainty for entrepreneurial team characterised by turnover in the control 
and direction of the company (Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998). In chapter 3, we 
link the founders’ power structure at the time of the IPO with the likelihood of them 
exiting the firm soon after the IPO. To better understand the entrepreneurial exit 
mechanism via IPO, we distinguish three exit choices of entrepreneurs connected to 
the IPO event. Founders may exit financially by selling all their shares to become 
employees in the venture they founded; they may exit managerially, leaving the top 
management team and the board of directors while holding on to their shares; or they 
may choose to totally exit the venture by leaving the company completely. The 
empirical results show that founders with less power (namely, structural, ownership, 
expertise and prestige power) at the time of IPO are more likely to totally exit the firm 
soon after the IPO. This finding suggest that when the entrepreneur loses power and 
control of their project, they may become frustrated and totally disassociate with the 
project. And these power-exit relationships are found to be moderated by the IPO 
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institutional environment (being listed in the main market of LSE or AIM). However, 
the power dimensions cannot explain equally well the partial exit behaviour of 
entrepreneurs after IPO. Only prestige power approximated by media coverage would 
prevent the founders from the financial exit. And founder-CEOs or chairmen, holding 
more structural power, are less likely to quit managerially.  Actually, we found that 
founders’ partial exit are associated with their lifestyle and demographic factors. 
More specifically, financial exit of the founder is driven by their financial motivations 
of the IPO. Founders who list their firms in the main LSE market and during the hot 
period tend to receive high returns of their shares, and thereby are more likely to exit 
financially. Meanwhile, compared with female entrepreneurs, males are more likely 
exit financially via IPO. Instead, our study point to a lifestyle motivation for 
managerial exit. Older founders and serial entrepreneurs are more likely to quit 
managerially via IPO.  
  The founder’s exit is a transition period for a venture, which may leave the 
company in a situation of great uncertainty, but also provide a chance for the venture 
to transfer to a more professional and mature stage. In chapter 4 we review the 
literature and found a clear inconsistency in relation to the benefits and drawbacks of 
the exit of founders. We empirically tested the association between the exit of the 
main founder and the firm performance for post-IPO stage. The findings of our 
analysis show that, in the short-term, the exit of the main founder after IPO generates 
a significant negative signal in the eyes of the investors which lowers the firm’s stock 
return. However, in the long run, the firm benefits from the main founder’s departure 
while the new CEOs generally help to improve the business performance and 
profitability. This is true particularly for the firms that operated under high debt ratio 
after IPO. In other words, the exit of the main founder provides a way to introduce 
98 
new investors to the business, whose participation may help to diffuse the financial 
crisis and improve the performance of the company. 
 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of the thesis contribute to both the research of entrepreneurship and 
general management with respect to improve our understanding about the founder’s 
role in the IPO process (before and after) for the entrepreneurial ventures. Our studies 
make distinct contributions to the entrepreneurship literature by validating of the 
categorical imperative mechanism for entrepreneurs, demonstrating the importance of 
the consistent founder’s identity in the external resource acquisition of the 
organisation and empirically investigating different routes and effect of 
entrepreneurial exit via IPO. This thesis also contribute to the general management 
literature. More specifically, the findings of chapter 2 contribute to the social 
categorization research (Zuckerman, 1999; Zuckerman et. al, 2003) via recognizing 
the importance of studying multidimensional category spaces, the cross-classification 
effects and the role of third party affiliations in legitimating category spanners. And 
the findings of chapter 3 extends the power-succession literature (Boeker, 1992; Shen 
& Cannella, 2002) by applying power theory to a novel context (founders’ exit). 
  In practice, this thesis provides several valuable suggestions to entrepreneurs 
getting listed their business in the open market. First, it is better for founders to 
highlight the category they are specialized in when raising fund in the open market. 
Even though diversified experience may benefit founders in developing their business 
at the founding stage (Lazear, 2004, 2005; Roberts, et al., 2013), a clear identity of 
themselves is needed for them to legitimate the business in front of the investors. 
Second, for category spanners, specializing in one category dimension will help 
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entrepreneurs to eliminate the damage of spanning in another dimension of category, 
and gaining a strong endorsements from third parties may also help to reduce the 
penalty of totally hybrid across multiple category dimensions. Third, founder’s 
departure after IPO will benefit the ventures via transferring their operation from 
entrepreneurial style to professional style and also provides an efficient way to reduce 
the debt burden of the firm. However, the negative signal it generated to the public 
investors cannot be ignored. To avoid this dilemma, it is better for the venture to issue 
another positive news of the company together with the announcement of founder exit. 
LIMITATION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis advances our knowledge of the external resource acquisition and 
entrepreneurial exit behaviour via IPO, but it still has a number of limitations.  Only 
a small portion of entrepreneurial firms are eligible to list in the open market. Most 
ventures choose to raise money or leave the business through other channels, such as 
business angels and venture capitalists. Whether the conclusions of studies are also 
valid for other funding process and quitting routes remains to be further discussed. 
Meanwhile, the datasets only focus on firms incorporated in UK and further research 
could be run on entrepreneurial firms listed in other culture and market to test the 
generalizability of the conclusion.  
Another limitation originates from the research method of the studies. The 
regression analysis only allow us to test the association between the power holding by 
the founder at the time of IPO and their exit behaviour thereafter. It cannot distinguish 
between the cases of founders that lost power before IPO and viewed IPO as an 
opportunity to exit and other founders that lost power during the IPO negotiation and 
make the exit decision during the process. Field studies could be conducted to further 
distinguish these two cases. 
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In terms of the effect analysis of entrepreneurial exit, chapter 4 only discusses the 
influence of founders’ quit from their managerial position. However, as discussed in 
the chapter 3, entrepreneurs have three exit routes to choose. More research could be 
conducted to further explore whether different entrepreneurial exit routes may 
generate different effects over the business. 
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